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1. The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) signed the CISG on April 11, 1980 and
ratified it on December 27, 1984. The Law on Ratification of the Convention was published in the Official
Gazette of the SFRY, MU 10/84. On March 12, 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) notified
the UNCITRAL Secretariat that the Convention had been in force with respect to FRY as of April 27, 1992,
i.e., as of the date of state succession. When constitutional changes were made in the FRY in 2003, the
CISG remained in force in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (former FRY) in accordance with
Article 63 of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union. OFFICIAL GAZETTE SM, Nos. 1/03 and 26/05.
Upon Montenegro’s declaration of independence of June 3, 2006, all international treaties to which the
State Union was a party to, including the CISG, remained in force only in respect to the Republic of Serbia,
as provided by Article 60(4) of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union and confirmed by the decision
of June 5, 2006 of the Serbian Parliament. Montenegro’s contracting status to the CISG was later confirmed
by filing a notification of succession. See STATUS 1980—UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/
1980CISG_status.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) [hereinafter STATUS 1980].
2. There are only seven court decisions reported on Paragraf Lex and Ing-Pro, two major Serbian
electronic databases of domestic case-law. The authors of this paper are fairly sure that there are dozens of
other CISG cases existing in Serbian courts, but one would need to know about them first in order to find
them by the case number in the court archives.
3. The FTCA is a permanent arbitration body founded in 1947 that provides for conciliation and
arbitration services in settling disputes of international business character when the parties have agreed
upon its jurisdiction in accordance with its rules. It is the only institutional arbitration in Serbia that resolves
cross-border disputes and has so far handled over 8,000 cases. Proceedings before the FTCA are governed
by the Rules of the FTCA and by the provisions of the arbitration agreement. The parties may also stipulate
that the procedure before the FTCA will be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The Rules of the Foreign Trade Court of
Arbitration at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, arts. 45(1) and 46(1), available at http://eng.komora.net/
ForeignTradeCourtofArbitration/tabid/1029/Default.aspx; see generally Mirko Vasiljeviæ, Priroda i
I. INTRODUCTION
Although former Yugoslavia had been active in the drafting process of the
1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
and was one of the first countries to ratify the CISG,  the subsequent1
application of the CISG before national courts and arbitral tribunals based in
Serbia has not been monitored on a regular basis. This survey attempts to
bridge a serious gap which has occurred in reporting cases on the CISG
originating from Serbia.
Although one would occasionally learn of a correct or incorrect
application of the CISG, only after the advent of organized electronic
databases of court case-law could one actually attempt to assess how often
Serbian courts dealt with the CISG. Because of the difficulties in accessing
Serbian court decisions that apply the CISG,  our analysis focuses on the2
caseload handled by the Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration at the Serbian
Chamber of Commerce (FTCA).  Given that the FTCA has an average load3
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karakteristike Spoljnotrgovinske arbitraže pri Privrednoj komori Jugoslavije u Beogradu [Nature and
Characteristics of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Court at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce in
Belgrade], 1 ARBITRAŽA 3–13 (2000); Dobrosav Mitroviæ, Spoljnotrgovinska arbitraža pri Privrednoj
komori Srbije [Foreign Trade Arbitration Court at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce], ARBITRAŽA
122–29 (2003); GASO KNEŽEVIÆ & VLADIMIR PAVIÆ, ARBITRAŽA I ADR [ARBITRATION AND ADR] 17–180
(2009); M. Wietzorek, Arbitration in Serbia, 2009 AUSTRIAN ARB. Y.B. 357, 357–82; Serbian Chamber
of Commerce, Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration, http://eng.komora.net/ForeignTradeCourtofArbitration/
tabid/1029/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
4. Compare World Trade Organization [WTO], Serbia Trade Profile, http://stat.wto.org/
CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=RS (Oct. 2009), with STATUS 1980,
supra note 1. It must also be noted that upon Albania’s accession to the CISG on May 13, 2009, all member
states of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), to which Serbia is a party, are now parties
to the CISG as well. Consequently, it may be reasonably expected that the volume of trade between Serbian
enterprises and enterprises from other CISG Contracting States will further increase in the future. These
expectations are also supported by the recent amendments of the Free Trade Agreement between Serbia and
Russia of April 3, 2009 that expanded the list of the goods covered by the CEFTA and anticipated entry
into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Serbia and EU guaranteeing
easier and predominantly customs-free access of Serbian products to European markets and vice versa. See
Importing from Serbia, http://www.siepa.sr.gov.yu/site/en/home/1/importing_from_serbia/
trade_regulations/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
5. This fact is likely to change in the future given that the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law
has recently joined the Queen Mary translation program founded by the Institute for International
Commercial Law at the Pace University School of Law and the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at
Queen Mary, University of London. Albert H. Kritzer & Loukas A. Mistelis, Taming the Dragons of
Uniform Law: Sharing the Reasoning of Courts and Arbitral Tribunals—English Case Texts and
Translated Case Texts, 5 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. ARB. 282, 286 (2001). Dozens of translations of the
FTCA awards exist at the Pace web site. See Electronic Library on International Commercial Law and the
CISG, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#serbia (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
of 25-30 cases per year of which all are international and many deal with sale
of goods, and that over 80% of Serbian trade is directed to other CISG
contracting states,  we assumed that there were plenty of unreported cases4
waiting in the FTCA archives. It turned out that, luckily, our assumptions were
correct. As a starting point, we selected the year 2000, which was the year that
international economic sanctions against Serbia were fully lifted, allowing for
unhindered trade and resumption of normal and transparent methods of
dispute settlement among trading partners (although this was not reflected
immediately on the caseload of the FTCA—disputes usually need some time
to ripen).
We identified 100 cases within the nine year period starting in 2000 in
which the application of the CISG was at stake—sometimes applied,
sometimes overlooked. This finding was particularly important given the
scarcity of reported CISG case law coming from Serbia and former
Yugoslavia.  These cases dealt with a wide variety of sales contracts—from5
sales of raspberries, wheat, and fresh mushrooms to sales of paper rolls, steel
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6. For more on the CISG sphere of application in Serbian legal doctrine, see ALEKSANDAR ÆIRIÆ
& RADOMIR DJUROVIÆ, MEDJUNARODNO TRGOVINSKO PRAVO, POSEBNI DEO [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LAW, SPECIAL PART] 50–52 (2005); MLADEN DRAŠKIÆ & MAJA STANIVUKOVIÆ, UGOVORNO PRAVO
MEDJUNARODNE TRGOVINE [THE CONTRACT LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE] 133–48 (2005); GASO
KNEŽEVIÆ, MERODAVNO PRAVO ZA TRGOVAÈKI UGOVOR O MEDJUNARODNOJ PRODAJI ROBE [APPLICABLE
LAW TO THE CONTRACT FOR INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS] (1989); JELENA PEROVIÆ, BITNA POVREDA
UGOVORA—MEDJUNARODNA PRODAJA ROBE [FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF CONTRACT—INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS] 32–84 (2004); VLADIMIR STOJILJKOVIÆ, MEDJUNARODNO PRIVREDNO PRAVO
[INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW] 141–43 (2003); TIBOR VARADY ET AL., MEDJUNARODNO PRIVATNO
PRAVO [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 422–27 (2007); JELENA VILUS, KOMENTAR KONVENCIJE UN O
MEDJUNARODNOJ PRODAJI ROBE 1980 [COMMENTARY ON THE 1980 UN CONVENTION FOR CONTRACTS ON
pipes, and timber; from sales of DVD-DVX players to sales of milk packaging
machines and locomotives. The value at stake in these disputes also varied
considerably; some of the transactions were minuscule, while others were
worth millions of U.S. dollars or euros. However, as one would expect, the
value involved in a dispute does not necessarily reflect its legal complexity
and some of the cases turned out to be extremely interesting for the purposes
of our research. Still, the vast majority of the cases follow a similar scenario:
the seller sues the buyer for non-payment of the contract price. Nevertheless,
such a simple scenario has raised some interesting questions with regards to
the CISG’s scope of application and, even more so, the applicable interest rate
that should be applied to outstanding payments. Finally, having approximately
100 cases to analyze enabled us to observe a wide range of interesting topics
that are helpful for developing a proper understanding of the application of the
CISG. We have, therefore, addressed the issues dealt with in the awards
topically rather than analyzing every case separately. This, in our opinion,
allows for a more streamlined presentation and, hopefully, somewhat more
interesting reading material. Also, given that Serbian scholarly work on CISG
has rarely been translated into English, we have included, where appropriate,
basic references to the relevant articles and monographs on the CISG
published in Serbia.
II. SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF THE CISG
The initial step towards a correct application, or a correct non-application,
of the CISG is assessing whether the contract falls within its scope. In order
to be governed by the CISG, Article 1 of the CISG requires a contractual
relationship that is international in its character and deals with the “sale of
goods” and a proper connection between the parties to the contract and the
laws of the CISG Contracting States.6
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INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS] 3–17 (1981); Maja Stanivukoviæ, Polje primene Konvencije UN o
ugovorima o medjunarodnoj prodaji robe u dosadašnjoj sudskoj i arbitražnoj praksi [Sphere of
Application of the CISG in the Current Court and Arbitral Practice], PRAVO I PRIVREDA No. 5-8/00,
931–44 (2000); Radovan D. Vukadinoviæ, Teritorijalni domašaj primene Konvencije UN o ugovorima o
medjunarodnoj prodaji [Territorial Extent of Application of the CISG], PRAVO I PRIVREDA No. 5-8/07,
427–40 (2007).
7. See STATUS 1980, supra note 1.
8. The award makes reference to a “daughter company” of the Swiss seller. It cannot be deduced
from the award itself whether the daughter company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swiss company,
its branch office, or representation office.
1. International Character of the Contract
The first prerequisite for the application of the CISG is that the
underlying contract is international in nature. This requirement is derived from
the wording of Article 1, which states that “the [CISG] applies to the contracts
. . . between the parties whose places of business are in different states . . . .”
If a party has several places of business, the relevant place of business for
determination of the international nature of the contract will be the one which
has “the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, having regard
to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract,” as set out in Article 10 CISG.
The Serbian translation of the CISG contained in the Law on Ratification
of the Convention  refers to the “seat” of a party in both Articles 1 and 10 and7
not to its “place of business,” which is used in the English text of the CISG.
Although these two terms often coincide, this may not always be the case.
Hence, the Serbian translation suffers from inherent logical inconsistencies,
since a company cannot have more than one seat. To the best of our
knowledge, this mistake in translation has not adversely affected the
application of Article 10 of the CISG in Serbia to this date.
The issue of multiple places of business arose only once in the cases we
examined. In that case, a Swiss seller and a Serbian buyer entered a contract
of sale. When the Serbian buyer defaulted on his payments, representatives of
seller’s daughter company,  based in Serbia, interfered by attempting to assure8
that the delay in payment would be as short as possible. It was, therefore,
questionable whether, in light of the daughter company’s involvement and the
contract’s language, Serbian, the entire transaction had only superficial
contacts with Switzerland and the seller’s Serbian establishment was, in
effect, the place of business most closely connected with the contract and its
performance within the meaning of CISG Article 10. The sole arbitrator found
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9. Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Award No. T-04/05,
July 5, 2008.
10. This provision has given rise to a great deal of controversy with respect to the assessment of its
character, prevailing methodology, and interaction with the reservation contained in Article 95. See JOHN
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
passim (3d ed. 1999); Christophe Bernasconi, The Personal and Territorial Scope of the Vienna
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Article 1), 46 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 137, 141
(1999) (Neth.); Loukas Mistelis, CISG and Arbitration, in CISG METHODOLOGY 375 passim (Andre
Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009); Alexis Mourre, Application of the Vienna International Sales
Convention in Arbitration, 17 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULLETIN 43–44 (2006); Georgios Petrochilos,
Arbitration Conflict of Laws Rules and the 1980 International Sales Convention, 52 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 191–218 (1999) (Fr.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
petrochilos.html#N_15_.; Jacob Ziegel, The Scope of the Convention: Reaching Out to Article One and
Beyond, 25 J.L. & COM. 59, 59 (2005).
11. CISG art. 1(1)(a), (b). In the context of this study, the reservation of Article 95 has not appeared
to be relevant since neither former Yugoslavia nor Serbia have made this reservation and there were no
situations which called for taking the said reservation into account.
12. The Rules of the Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration [hereinafter The Rules of the FTCA], arts.
that the transaction was genuinely international and that the Swiss
headquarters had played a decisive role in the conclusion and performance of
the contract because it negotiated and signed the contract, it transported and
installed the equipment, and the payment was effectuated to its account.
Therefore, it was held that the CISG should be applied even without resorting
to the principle in dubio pro conventione.  It is worth noting that, when9
pointing out the erroneous translation of the CISG into the Serbian language,
the court made specific reference to the original English text of Article 10
rather than the Serbian translation contained in the Law on Ratification.
2. Relevant Nexus with the CISG Contracting State
Article 1(1) of the CISG defines which contractual relationship triggers
application of the CISG.  Specifically, the CISG should be applied when10
either both of the contracting parties have their place of business in different
contracting states, or the operation of private international law rules leads to
the application of the law of a Contracting State.  Given that cases before the11
FTCA usually involve a Serbian company as one of the parties and Serbian
trade is usually directed towards other contracting states, there are numerous
cases where conditions for CISG application are met.
Some features of the decision-making process under the FTCA rules are
common to other arbitration rules as well, e.g., parties are free to choose the
applicable law, or rules of law, and, absent express mandate of the parties,
arbitrators are not allowed to decide a case ex aequo et bono.  However,12
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48(1) and (4) (2007), available at http://eng.komora.net/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FBMu4VYIJUE%3D&
tabid=1029&mid=2441.
13. The Rules of the FTCA, art. 48(2) (2007), available at http://eng.komora.net/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=FBMu4VYIJUE%3D&tabid=1029&mid=244. The end result of this process need not be just the
choice of applicable law, but applicable rules of law as well. The 1997 version of the FTCA Rules allowed
arbitrators to choose only the applicable law (and not the applicable rules of law) in the absence of parties’
choice.
14. See International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] Rules of Arbitration, art. 17(1) (1998), available
at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/comarb/icc/rules.asp.
15. The Rules of the FTCA, art. 48(3) (2007), available at http://eng.komora.net/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=FBMu4VYIJUE%3D&tabid=1029&mid=2441.
16. See B.V./Quetard, Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.] [District Court], Gravenhage, June 7, 1995,
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=154&step=Abstract; CLOUT Case No.
where parties have not exercised their autonomy in choosing the applicable
law, or rules of law, arbitrators must arrive at the substantive solution by
application of the most appropriate conflict-of-laws rule  and not the most13
appropriate rules of law, as some institutional arbitration rules prescribe.  In14
all cases, arbitrators are bound to make the award in accordance with
contractual provisions and take into account relevant trade usages.15
In the majority of the FTCA cases, parties have not exercised their
freedom and have omitted to insert a choice of law clause in their contract. On
several occasions, parties reached agreement on the applicable law during the
arbitral hearing. There has been no explicit choice of the CISG as the
applicable law in the analyzed cases and only one case exists where the CISG
was expressly excluded. Consequently, the application of the CISG before the
FTCA has arisen either as a result of: (1) parties’ choice of the law of a
contracting state as applicable; (2) application of the CISG as a final result of
the conflict-of-laws approach; or (3) by direct application. These three groups
of cases will be elaborated in more detail later. Also, we will give special
attention to the issue of dissolution of SFRY and its effect on application of
the CISG in the FTCA practice. Finally, cases where the CISG was not
applied although all prerequisites for its application were met will be
discussed under the last heading of this section.
2.1.) Choice of the law of a Contracting State
One of the main principles of the CISG is party autonomy. Article 6 of
the CISG embodies this by allowing parties to contract out of the CISG or
vary the effect of any of its provisions. However, the majority of courts and
tribunals have taken a firm position that choosing the law of a contracting
state does not amount to the exclusion of the application of the CISG.16
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270 [Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, Nov. 25, 1998], available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981125g1.html; CLOUT Case No. 206 [Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court),
France, Dec. 17, 1996], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/draft/961217case.html; CLOUT
Case No. 166 [Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg (Arbitral Tribunal), Germany, Mar. 21, 1996],
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960321g1.html; CLOUT Case No. 93 [Internationales
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft (Arbitral Tribunal), Vienna, June 15,
1994], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a3.html; CLOUT Case No. 236
[Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, July 23, 1977], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/970723g1.html; ICC Arbitration Case No. 9187 (1999), available at http://www.unilex.info/case
.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=466&step=Abstract; ICC Arbitration Case No. 7844 (1995), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=123&step=Abstract; ICC Arbitration Case No. 8324
(1995), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=240&step=Abstract; ICC
Arbitration Case No. 7660 (1994), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/947660i1.html; ICC
Arbitration Case No. 6653 (1993), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653i1.html.
17. CLOUT Case No. 483 [Audiencia Provincial de Alicante (Appellate Court), Spain, Nov. 16,
2000] and CLOUT Case No. 49 [Oberlandesgericht Dûsseldorf (District Court), Germany, July 2, 1993],
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V94/239/16/IMG/V9423916.pdf?OpenElement.
18. CLOUT Case No. 429 [Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (District Court), Germany,
Aug. 20, 2000], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/abstracts.html; ICC Arbitration
Case No. 10849 (2000).
19. See Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Arbitral
Award No. SCH-4318, June 15, 1994 (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
940615a4.html; Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft, Arbitral
Award No. SCH-4366, June 15, 1994, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a3.html
(Austria); Vestnik Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda RF [The Highest Arbitration Court of the RF],
Information Letter 29, Feb. 16, 1998 (Russ.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=
case&id=365&step=Abstract; Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Budapest, Vb
94124, Nov. 17, 1995 (Hung.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=
217&step=Abstract; ICC Arbitration Case No. 7645 (1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/957645i1.html; ICC Arbitration Case No. 7660 (1994), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/947660i1.html. For a critique of this position, see Mourre, supra note 10, at 44. This could also open
the question of whether the choice of the law of a country which has made reservation under Article 95
would lead to application of its domestic rules or the Convention, even where both parties are from
Contracting States. According to at least one court decision, such choice of the law would still lead to
application of the CISG. See Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (D.N.J.
2005).
Exclusion of the CISG has to be either explicit, (e.g., in the form of a contract
term stating that “the CISG shall not be applied”) or at least implicit—either
by choosing the law of a non-contracting state  or pinpointing applicable17
provisions within the chosen legal system (e.g., “Swiss Code of Obligations
shall apply”).18
Opinions are not so uniform when it comes to identifying the exact basis
for applying the CISG when the law of a Contracting State is chosen. One
position stresses that party autonomy itself is a rule of private international
law within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b).  Another explanation indicates19
that, when the law of a contracting state is chosen, the CISG is applied as the
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20. See ICC Arbitration Case No. 7645 (1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/957645i1.html; ICC Arbitration Case No. 7754 (1995), available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=519&step=Abstract; Peter Schlechtriem, Article 1, in COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 34 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter CISG COMMENTARY]; Mourre, supra note 10, at 44; Peter
Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention in International Sales Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALES:
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1–53 (N.
Galston & H. Smit eds., 1984). A further account of the conceptual difficulties experienced in the practical
application of Article 1 is offered by Bruno Zeller in The CISG—Getting off the Fence, LAW INST. J., Sept.
2000, 73, 73–74 (Austr.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zeller4.html.
21. FTCA, Award No. T-02/00, Dec. 9, 2002.
22. FTCA, Award No. T-13/05, Jan. 5, 2007.
23. Id.
24. FTCA, Award No. T-13/08, Mar. 16, 2009; FTCA, Award No. T-05/08, Jan. 5, 2009; FTCA,
Award No. T-06/06, July 31, 2007.
primary source of those substantive rules, because ratified international
treaties usually occupy a tier above domestic legislation in the hierarchy of
legal sources.20
Taking into account that Serbia is a Contracting State and that most of the
foreign partners of Serbian companies, and foreign FTCA parties, come from
other contracting states, choice of law clauses, when inserted, usually point to
a law of a contracting state, be it Serbia or another country. In the majority of
the cases, arbitrators have correctly identified the consequences of such
choice.
In one FTCA decision, the sole arbitrator determined that the fact that a
Serbian and a Ukrainian company had chosen the Swedish law as applicable
triggered application of the CISG on the basis that Sweden is a Contracting
State and that the CISG is incorporated in its legal order.  Similarly, choice21
of Austrian law in a contract concluded between a Serbian company and a
German company has justly been interpreted to primarily point to the CISG,
with provisions of the Austrian Civil Code as a fall-back source.  The tribunal22
pointed out that:
Article 6 of the CISG allows parties to exclude application of the [CISG]. However, a
contract provision which points to Austrian law as applicable does not appear to manifest
the parties’ intention to exclude application of the [CISG], particularly due to the fact
that Austria has ratified the [CISG] and that, consequently, its provisions have become
part of Austrian law.23
Similarly, another FTCA tribunal understood choice of “substantive law of
Serbia and Montenegro” to mean choice of Serbian law, including the CISG.24
Moreover, even when the sales contract was concluded between a seller from
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25. FTCA, Award No. T-08/08, Jan. 28, 2009.
26. Constitution art. 194 (Serb.); Constitutional Charter of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro
art. 16; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992) art. 16.
27. The same position was taken in other awards. See FTCA, Award No. T-09/07, Jan. 23, 2008;
FTCA, Award No. T-16/04, July 18, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-18/04, May 24, 2005; FTCA, Award No.
T-19/03, June 15, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-13/02, May 9, 2003.
28. FTCA, Award No. T-01/07, Oct. 18, 2007.
29. For the sake of brevity and without prejudice to the ongoing dispute surrounding the name of
the country, we use in this article the adjective “Macedonian” to designate parties and laws originating from
the FYR Macedonia.
30. A similar outcome, where a contractual choice of Serbian (Yugoslav) law led to application of
the Serbian LCT, was reached in FTCA, Award No. T-10/07, Dec. 3, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-27/02,
June 6, 2003; FTCA, Award No. T-20/00, Apr. 3, 2002; FTCA, Award No. T-8/99, Dec. 25, 2000; FTCA,
a Contracting State (Serbia) and a buyer from a Non-Contracting State
(Albania), contractual choice of law pointing to the law of the Contracting
State (Serbia) was considered to trigger application of the CISG pursuant to
Article 1(1)(b), since “the primary rule respected in the private international
law, points to a law of the Contracting State—Serbia.”25
Although the selection of applicable law is more likely to happen at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, it can also take place at a later stage,
even at the hearing. For example, FTCA award number T-17/06 of
September 10, 2007 dealt with a contract between companies from the FYR
Macedonia and Serbia that did not contain a choice of law clause. However,
the parties’ representatives agreed at the hearing that Yugoslav law should be
applied. The sole arbitrator noted that the parties had expressed their choice.
Still, given that FR Yugoslavia had ceased to exist (and so did its successor,
Serbia and Montenegro) the arbitrator had to further interpret such a choice
in order to give it any effect. He found that the applicable law should be that
of Serbia, and within it, primarily CISG provisions,  while Serbian Law on26
Contracts and Torts (LCT) should be used to fill any gaps in the CISG.27
The FTCA case law also contains decisions where the CISG was not
applied although a disputed contract contained the choice of law clause calling
for application of the law of a CISG Contracting State. For example, in a
dispute between a Polish company and a Serbian company arising out of a
contract calling for application of Swiss law, the tribunal erroneously
concluded that the parties chose to apply Swiss domestic provisions,
specifically the Federal Code of Obligations, although Switzerland is a party
to the CISG.  A similar slip occurred in case number T-2/03 of October 21,28
2003 between a Serbian company and a Macedonian  company where the29
contract provided for Yugoslav law as applicable. Instead of applying the
CISG, arbitrators applied the Yugoslav (Serbian) LCT.  Also, in award30
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Award No. T-10/99, Oct. 16, 2000; FTCA, Award No. T-11/99, July 11, 2000.
31. See ICC Arbitration Case No. 7754 (1995), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=
1&do=case&id=519&step=FullText. See also CLOUT Case No. 326 [Kantonsgericht des Kantons Zug
(District Court), Switzerland, Mar. 16, 1995], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950316s1.html;
CLOUT Case No. 92 [Ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, Florence, Apr. 19, 1994], available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940419i3 (where the choice of Italian law was understood as implied
exclusion of the CISG); CLOUT Case No. 54 [Tribunale Civile di Monza (District Court), Italy, Jan. 14,
1993], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html.
32. Franco Ferarri, CISG Rules on Exclusion and Derogation: Article 6, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL
DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 114,
124–28 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtnår & Ronald Brand eds., 2004) [hereinafter UNCITRAL DIGEST];
Mourre supra note 10, at 44–45.
33. FTCA, Award No. T-19/08, Apr. 28, 2009 (involving the sale of mazut between Bosnian and
Serbian parties).
34. FTCA, Award No. T-02/08, Sept. 30, 2008.
number T-6/99 of October 15, 2001, the parties’ agreement to apply Yugoslav
law mistakenly resulted in application of the LCT, not the CISG. Similar
errors are fairly common in reported international cases,  and have been31
repeatedly criticized in legal doctrine.32
There has been only one case where the application of the CISG was
expressly excluded in the contract.  However, there has also been one case33
where the application of the CISG should have been avoided as contrary to
parties’ agreement, but the application of the CISG nevertheless occurred.
Namely, the contract for sale of fresh plums between a Serbian seller and a
Bosnian buyer contained the following provision: “the provisions of the Law
on Contracts and Torts shall apply to all the issues not covered by this
Contract.”  The sole arbitrator erred by interpreting this provision as an34
imprecise agreement on the applicable law since “it was not clear which Law
the parties have in mind” (although the same 1978 Yugoslav LCT was in force
in both countries where parties had their places of business, albeit now in the
guise of their own domestic laws). Hence, the arbitrator engaged in the
conflict-of-laws analysis in order to determine the applicable law. The end
result was the application of the Serbian law and primarily the application of
the CISG, as part of the Serbian law. Although the outcome of the dispute
would have been the same under the CISG and the LCT, since the claimant
requested payment of the remainder of the price, which he is entitled to under
both legal documents, the arbitrator’s disregard for the express choice of the
parties is striking. Fortunately, this was an isolated incident in the FTCA
practice.
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35. See ICC Arbitration Case No. 8247 (1996), available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?
dssid=2376&dsmid=13355&x=1.
36. Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 237, 246–47 (1996); Mourre, supra note 10, at 44;
Carolina Saf, A Study of the Interplay between the Conventions Governing International Contracts of Sale,
PACE 2.1 (Sept. 1999), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/saf7.html.
37. The Rules of the FTCA, supra note 13, at 48(2).
38. Compare CLOUT Case No. 164 [Arbitration Court of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce
& Indus., May 12, 1995], with CLOUT Case No. 174 [Arbitration Court of the Hungarian Chamber of
Commerce & Indus., Aug. 5, 1997].
2.2.) Application of the CISG when there was no choice of law of a
Contracting State
Where parties refrain from exercising their freedom of choice, there are
two additional scenarios for applying the CISG. The first approach is to have
a conflict-of-laws rule point to the law of a Contracting State. This conflict-of-
laws rule is usually the rule of “the closest connection,”  although it is35
conceivable to use somewhat less flexible connecting factors, such as the seat
of the party who provides a characteristic performance, which in the contract
of sale means that lex loci venditoris is applied. Occasionally, even Article
1(1)(a) of the CISG is interpreted as a unilateral conflict-of-laws rule pointing
to the rules common to both contracting parties, which are the rules of the
CISG when both parties have their relevant places of business in different
Contracting States.  The second possible approach is to construct the rules on36
choosing applicable substantive provisions so as not to insist on using a
traditional conflict-of-laws technique, but the application of the “most
appropriate rules of law.” This enables arbitrators to directly invoke
provisions of the CISG without any need to justify their choice via further
conflict-of-laws analyses.
It is, therefore, worth repeating that the Rules of the FTCA provide for
the conflict-of-laws method when deciding on the applicable law or applicable
rules.  FTCA practice reveals that arbitrators have taken different paths in37
meeting this requirement. In most of the cases where tribunals have correctly
applied the CISG in absence of parties’ choice, it is impossible to detect
whether this has been done on the basis of subsections (a) or (b) of Article
1(1). This ambivalence has already been noticed in the practice of other
arbitral institutions.  It is hard not to sympathize with this simplification, as38
it avoids a controversy which, at least in the practice of the arbitral tribunals,
rarely has practical implications.
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39. FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007.
40. Id. (noting that the respondent did not contest jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal so the
effectiveness of such split clause was not an issue in the proceedings).
41. Similar reasoning was reached in another case involving a Serbian seller and a Romanian buyer.
See FTCA, Award No. T-07/07, Aug. 19, 2008.
42. See, e.g., FTCA, Award No. T-15/06, Jan. 28, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-14/03, Oct. 18, 2007;
FTCA, Award No. T-22/05, Oct. 30, 2006; FTCA, Award No. T-17/02, Oct. 2, 2006; FTCA, Award No.
T-03/06, Sept. 14, 2006; FTCA, Award No. T-09/01, Feb. 23, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-03/01, Sept. 24,
2001; FTCA, Award No. T-15/01, Mar. 15, 2001.
43. FTCA, Award No. T-19/99, Nov. 22, 2000.
In a dispute between Serbian and Romanian companies, the tribunal
determined that Serbian law had the closest connection to the disputed
contract.  This was based on the fact that the preponderance of factors39
pointed to Serbia as the proper choice: the language of the contract was
Serbian; the seller’s seat was in Serbia; and the stipulated place of
performance was in Serbia. In addition, a “split” dispute resolution clause
provided, in addition to jurisdiction of the FTCA, for alternative jurisdiction
of Serbian courts.  Although the claimant had based its request on provisions40
of the Serbian LCT, the tribunal correctly determined that the CISG applied
instead. After designating Serbian law as applicable, the tribunal noted that
both Serbia and Romania are Contracting States to the CISG and went on to
apply the CISG in accordance with Article 194 of the Serbian Constitution,
which provides that ratified international treaties have primacy over domestic
legislation. Therefore, the end result was a correct application of the CISG,
while the actual basis for application remained undisclosed.41
Award No. T-4/01 of May 10, 2002 dealt with a dispute between
Yugoslav and Bulgarian companies. Application of conflict-of-laws rules led
the tribunal to Bulgarian law as the proper law of contract. The tribunal then
went on to apply the CISG as a part of Bulgarian law. Just like in the above
mentioned case, the tribunal then muddled its justification, stating that the
CISG was ratified by both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and had, consequently,
become part of their internal legal orders. Once again, arbitrators avoided
getting entangled in the intricacies of Article 1(1). Similar approaches have
been used in a significant number of cases where the CISG was applied.42
In one case involving Yugoslav and Greek companies, the parties made
a clearly imperfect choice, providing for application of either Serbian or
Greek law.  This alternative clause was naturally impossible to effectuate43
once the dispute arose. Arbitrators therefore disregarded it and, through
conflict-of-laws technique, decided to apply Yugoslav substantive rules. As
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44. This provision had a similar effect to the current Article 194 of Serbian Constitution regarding
primacy of international conventions.
45. FTCA, Award No. T-16/99, Feb. 12, 2001. At present, though, Cyprus is a Contracting State
of the CISG.
46. This was the technique used in FTCA, Award No. T-18/07, Oct. 15, 2008; FTCA, Award No.
T-13/05, Jan. 5, 2007; FTCA, Award No. T-22/03, Jan. 19, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-22/03, Jan. 19, 2004
(where the arbitrators immediately invoked Article 1 of the CISG, without prior conflict-of-laws analysis).
FTCA, Award No. T-22/05, Oct. 30, 2006, stated that the CISG should “primarily be applied” and the
conflict-of-laws technique has been used only to determine rules which supplement the CISG. In FTCA,
Award No. T-15/06, Jan. 28, 2008, the tribunal noted that the parties have not chosen the proper law and
decided that the CISG should be applied “since the conditions for its application are fulfilled.” In some of
the awards, the CISG has been applied as “the most appropriate” instrument and the conflict-of-laws
technique was consulted only to fill the gaps in the CISG. See FTCA, Award No. T-12/04, Jan. 24, 2006;
FTCA, Award No. T-03/05, Dec. 15, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-10/04, Nov. 6, 2005; FTCA, Award No.
T-09/01, Feb. 23, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-18/01 Nov. 27, 2002; FTCA Award No. T-17/01, Apr. 12,
2002; FTCA, Award No. T-15/01, Mar. 15, 2001.
47. Pierre Mayer, L’application par l’arbitre des conventions internationales de droit privé, in
L’INTERNATIONALISATION DU DROIT: MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE YVON LOUSSOUARN 275, 287 (Dalloz
ed., 1994); Petrochilos, supra note 10.
their primary Yugoslav source of rules of law, they have chosen the CISG in
accordance with Article 16 of the FRY Constitution.44
In another case one of the parties had its place of business in the
Contracting State, FR Yugoslavia, while its counterpart was established in
Cyprus, a non-contracting state at the time. The tribunal correctly applied the
CISG, but again avoided pinpointing the basis for its application, although it
was clear that it could have been only Article 1(1)(b). Instead, it invoked the
internal hierarchy of applicable rules and primacy of international sources
over domestic legislation.45
2.3.) Direct application of the CISG
In some of the cases before the FTCA where both parties came from
CISG contracting states provisions of the CISG have been applied through
direct reference to Article 1(1)(a) of the CISG.  Had it been employed by the46
courts, this approach would require no further analysis. However, direct
application of the CISG on the basis of Article 1(1)(a) is quite different in the
arbitral setting because the arbitral tribunal is not a state organ and as such, is
not bound by the treaties ratified by the state where it is situated.  Hence, it47
is important to note that although the application of the CISG in these cases
was correct, the tribunals avoided spelling out whether they used Article
1(1)(a) as a unilateral conflict-of-laws rule, which seems plausible given that
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48. See Mayer, supra note 46, at 282; Petrochilos, supra note 10.
49. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
50. This Convention applies, pursuant to its Article 7, only to the successions, which have occurred
after the Convention entered into force, as of November 6, 1996, unless the concerned states agree
otherwise. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 7, Aug. 23, 1978,
1946 U.N.T.S. 3. Given that the dissolution of SFRY was held completed in 1992, it can be argued that the
1978 Vienna Convention is inapplicable to this issue. Furthermore, it has often been said in the legal
doctrine that the formulation of Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention cannot be taken as reflective of
international customary law. Even the automatic state succession to humanitarian treaties is highly
controversial and is not supported by much state practice. Moreover, the International Court of Justice never
expressed an opinion to the question whether or not the automatic succession reflects international
customary law. Consequently, the area of state succession is still deemed as “an area of great uncertainty
and controversy,” even amongst the international public law scholars. See generally IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 650, 663–64 (5th ed. 1998); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2001); V. RAKIÆ-VODINELIÆ ET AL., PRESTANAK SFRJ—PRAVNE POSLEDICE
[DISSOLUTION OF THE SFRY—LEGAL CONSEQUENCES] 17 (1995); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
976–77 (6th ed. 2008); Int’l Law Ass’n, 2002 ILA Rapport final sur la succession en matière de traits, 14,
available at http://www.ila-hq.org; Akbar Rasulov, Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties:
Is There a Case for Automaticity?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141 (2003); Maren Tamke, Succession of States to
Multilateral Treaties (2001), available at http://www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/104018.html.
51. See Int’l Law Ass’n, supra note 50, at 14; D. Dimitrijeviæ, Sukcesija država u odnosu na
medjunarodne ugovore SFRJ [Succession of States with Respect to Treaties Signed by SFRY], STRANI
PRAVNI ŽIVOT Nos. 1-2/2005, 33–35, at 9.
FTCA Rules require conflict-of-laws methodology in determining applicable
substantive provisions, or for its persuasive force.48
2.4.) Effects of dissolution of SFRY to application of the CISG
The CISG entered into force on the territory of former Yugoslavia
(SFRY) on January 1, 1988. However, the dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990’s raised the question of application of the CISG in the
case of state succession by what are now six independent countries—the
former federal units, republics, of the SFRY.  Namely, were the newly49
independent ex-Yugoslav republics to be regarded as the CISG contracting
states automatically upon dissolution of SFRY or not?
The answer to this question is simple if we accept the position of Article
34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of
Treaties. This article provides, in case of dissolution of a state, for automatic
continuation of application of the multilateral treaties signed by the
predecessor state in the territory of the successor state.  This view can also50
be supported by the fact that many of the former Yugoslav republics have,
together with their declarations of independence, made firm commitments that
the treaties entered into by the SFRY will remain in force in their territories.51
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52. See STATUS 1980, supra note 1.
53. Bernasconi advises business persons wanting to conclude an international sale contract with a
partner who has his place of business in one of the newly independent Republics of both the former USSR
and the former Yugoslavia, in order to avoid uncertainty as to CISG’s application, to implement into the
contract a clear and unequivocal choice of law rule, either in favor of the CISG or in favor of one particular
national legal order. See Bernasconi, supra note 10, at 154.
54. See STATUS 1980, supra note 1.
55. On one hand, the practice of making notifications by the successor states and the acceptance by
the depositories could be interpreted as a statement against automatic succession, since had it been
otherwise, the status of a Contracting State to the multilateral treaty would be established ipso facto from
the date when such state declares independence. On the other, the practice of filing notifications of
successions should be interpreted as concerned state’s assistance to the depository for clarifying the
situation and enabling the depository to modify the list of the Contracting States, thus preventing the risk
of annulling their acts in the future. See Tamke, supra note 50.
56. Only FTCA, Award No. T-16/07, June 18, 2008, deals with the dispute arising out of a contract
concluded after Macedonia’s filing of notification of succession to the CISG.
With respect to the CISG, these promises were further formalized by filing
notifications of successions with retroactive application covering the period
from the date of state succession to the date of filing of notification.52
However, these actions were not made with the same expeditiousness by all
of the former Yugoslav republics, thus creating legal uncertainty for private
parties as to the status of the CISG in the legal systems concerned.  While53
Montenegro waited only four and a half months from the date of its
independence to file a notification of succession to the CISG, it took Bosnia
little less than two years, Croatia six and a half years, and over 15 years in the
case of Macedonia.  Consequently, it is necessary to reopen a controversial54
and unsettled issue of international public law regarding effects of the
notifications of successions to treaties, whether they are of declaratory or
constitutive character.  These effects, especially in Macedonian case, might55
have important consequences on application of the CISG in the region.
Should Macedonian parties to contracts concluded in the period between
the date of state succession, November 17, 1991, and the date of receipt of
notification of succession to the CISG, November 22, 2006, be considered as
coming from a CISG contracting state for the purposes of Article 1(1)(a)
CISG? If Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG points to Macedonian law, should the
CISG be applied when the contract was concluded in the abovementioned
period? These questions are not purely academic, since some of them have
already been addressed in the FTCA practice. However, the approach of the
FTCA tribunals with respect to this issue has not been unanimous.
We have identified 14 FTCA awards in the matter of international sales
where one of the parties appearing before arbitration was Macedonian.  In56
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57. The tribunal applied Serbian LCT instead of CISG in FTCA, Award No. T-08/99, Dec. 25, 2000;
FTCA, Award No. T-10/99, Oct. 16, 2000; and FTCA, Award No. T-11/99, July 11, 2000.
58. The CISG was applied in FTCA, Award No. T-37/03, May 17, 2004, and FTCA, Award No.
T-25/06, Nov. 13, 2007. The CISG was not applied in the FTCA, Award No. T-05/01, Nov. 29, 2001. It
is not clear what law the arbitrator applied in FTCA, Award No. T-28/03, Apr. 26, 2004, when granting
seller’s request for payment of the price.
59. FTCA, Award No. T-11/05–12, Dec. 16, 2005.
60. FTCA, Award No. T-14/04, Feb. 21, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-15/04, Feb. 21, 2005. The same
arbitrator decided both awards.
61. See supra text accompanying note 49.
some of these cases, the contract contained a choice-of-law clause calling for
application of Serbian (Yugoslav) law and the tribunals have reached different
results, deciding on some occasions to apply the CISG, resorting to the
application of the LCT on others.  Where there was no choice of law,57
tribunals did not address the issue of Macedonia’s contracting status to the
CISG and instead chose Serbian rules as the most appropriate, pursuant to
Article 46(2) of the FTCA Rules.  There is one case where the tribunal,58
without addressing the issue of applicable law, went straightforward to
applying the Serbian LCT.  Finally, in one third of these cases the arbitrators59
addressed the issue of whether Macedonia was to be considered a CISG
Contracting State prior to filing a notification of succession. We will focus our
attention on this last group of cases.
In the two cases decided prior to Macedonia’s notification of succession,
the sole arbitrator started with examining Article 46(2) of the FTCA Rules and
found that the Serbian law, as the law of the seller, should be deemed the most
appropriate law to apply to the case at hand. This led to application of the
CISG as part of Serbian law. However, in elaborating the reasons for CISG’s
application, the arbitrator stated the following:
Since the seller is a Serbian company, the applicable law should be the law of Serbia, i.e.
the Law on Contracts and Torts. However, since both states on whose territory the parties
have places of business were constituents of former SFRY, and since the SFRY has
signed the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods and the
contract at hand is the contract for international sale of goods, the arbitrator considers the
Vienna (UNCITRAL) Convention as also applicable for reasons of automatic succession
to multilateral treaties.60
Although the final application of the CISG was in our view correct, it is
notable that the arbitrator implicitly invoked Article 1(1)(a) as the basis for
application of the CISG and not Article 1(1)(b). Any justification of such an
approach would prove to be controversial since the position of international
law on state succession to treaties is not that clear  and Macedonia was not61
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62. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Backbone or Backyard of the Convention? The CISG’s Final
Provisions, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, FESTSCHRIFT
FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 425, 459–60 (Camilla B.
Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008) (arguing that under the “continuity principle” the CISG
continues in force in successor States and notifications that are declaratory in nature only confirm
preexisting law).
63. This view can, inter alia, be supported by the fact that the FYR Macedonia contracting status
to the CISG was confirmed on the UNCITRAL web site only upon filing of such notification.
64. The Secretary-General, Depositary Notification (Nov. 27, 2006), http://treaties.un.org/doc/
treaties/1998/12/19981208%2003-03%20AM/Related%20Documents/CN.1103.2006-Eng.pdf.
listed on the UNCITRAL web site as the CISG contracting state at the time
when the award was made.
There are three FTCA cases decided after Macedonia filed a notification
of succession and was listed on the UNCITRAL web site as a CISG
Contracting State. In award number T-23/06 of September 15, 2008, in a
dispute between a Serbian seller and a Macedonian buyer, the CISG was
applied as part of the Serbian law on the basis of the conflict-of-laws method.
The sole arbitrator explicitly noted in the obiter dictum that the analysis of
CISG application on the basis of Article 1(1)(a) was purposefully omitted
although Macedonia was a party to the CISG at the time of the making of the
award, since this was not the case at the time of the contract conclusion. The
opposite conclusion was reached in the awards T-8/07 of May 9, 2008 and
T-1/08 of November 17, 2008, where the CISG was applied on the basis of
Article 1(1)(a) despite the fact that the underlying contract was concluded
prior to Macedonia’s filing of notification of succession to the CISG.
It appears that the conditions for application of the CISG on the basis of
Article 1(1)(a) were met in all of these cases regardless of the nature and legal
effects of Macedonian notification of succession. On one hand, if such
notification is of a declaratory character,  there are no reasons for denying62
application of the CISG in these cases since the CISG was in fact in force at
the time of the contract conclusion. On the other hand, if it is of a constitutive
character,  the text of the notification specifying the date of CISG’s entry into63
force in Macedonia as the date of state succession, November 17, 1991,64
justifies the application of the CISG to contracts concluded after the date of
succession, where the disputes arising out of these contracts were decided
after the date of notification. Consequently, the phrasing of Macedonian
notification of succession suggests that once Macedonia filed notification of
succession all the obstacles were removed in finding the CISG applicable.
This would be either by virtue of Article 1(1)(a), whenever the Macedonian
party concluded the contract with another party based in a contracting state,
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65. The controversies regarding legal character of notification of succession are also relevant with
respect to the 1974 Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods. Former
Yugoslavia acceded to this convention on Nov. 27, 1978. Yet, only those former Yugoslav republics who
have filed notifications of succession are listed on the UNCITRAL web site as Contracting States. Neither
Croatia nor FYR Macedonia, which are undisputedly successor states to the SFRY, are, at this moment,
listed as Contracting States. See STATUS 1974—CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1974
Convention_status.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
or pursuant to Article 1(1)(b), whenever the rules of private international law
point to Macedonian law as applicable, irrespective of the date on which the
contract was concluded. However, we note that such outcome does not fit
neatly with the idea expressed in Article 100 of the CISG in all cases,
especially if the notification is regarded to be of the constitutive character.
The tension between Article 100 of the CISG and the potentially
constitutive nature of notification would be particularly strong in the cases
where Macedonian law was explicitly chosen as the proper law of the contract
and the contract was concluded after the Macedonian declaration of
independence but prior to Macedonian notification of succession to the CISG.
It could be argued that, by opting for Macedonian law in such a case, the
parties did not intend to be bound by the CISG since it did not form part of the
Macedonian law at the time of contract conclusion. The CISG has a built-in
mechanism to protect parties’ legitimate expectations. One is contained in
Article 100(2), which insulates the parties from subsequent CISG
incorporation into national law(s). Without such provision, parties who
contract after the CISG enters into force in the relevant jurisdiction(s) would
be given greater freedom. They could always exclude application of the CISG
via Article 6, while the parties who contracted before CISG entry into force
would be deprived of such opportunity. Consequently, there is ambiguity
surrounding successions and the status of membership of Macedonia to the
CISG (after all, Macedonia was not listed among contracting states of the
CISG at the UNCITRAL web site for 15 years ). In particular, notifications65
of succession which, in effect, confirm that a state was bound by the CISG for
the past decade and a half seem to run contrary to the spirit of Article 100 and
the need for legal certainty. In that context, Article 100 would be powerless
to protect the legitimate expectations of the parties. Therefore, in the light of
these circumstances, it may be justified to interpret the parties’ choice of
Macedonian law in the contracts concluded between November 17, 1991 and
November 22, 2006 as the choice of Macedonian internal law (LCT) and not
the CISG.
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66. See supra Part II.2.4 (the significance of this issue is limited to disputes arising out of the
contracts concluded prior to Nov. 22, 2006).
67. FTCA, Award No. T-10/07, Dec. 3, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-10/06, Nov. 27, 2006; FTCA,
Award No. T-07/05, May 5, 2006; FTCA, Award No. T-11/05–12, Dec. 16, 2005; FTCA, Award No.
T-03/04, Nov. 4, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-38/03, Sept. 23, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-21/03, May 18,
2004; FTCA, Award No. T-13/01, Sept. 12, 2002; FTCA, Award No. T-04/99, July 8, 2002; FTCA, Award
No. T-07-01, Feb. 21, 2002; FTCA, Award No. T-01/00, Dec. 7, 2000; FTCA, Award No. T-17/98, Dec. 7,
2000.
68. See FTCA, Award No. T-03/03, Jan. 30, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-05/02, Apr. 24, 2003. The
latter award invokes Serbian LCT only with respect to the right to claim interest. However, we do not
consider this as a sufficiently clear indication on whether the sole arbitrator applied CISG or domestic
Serbian provisions to the other aspects of the contractual relationship. This hesitation stems from the fact
that there were quite a few decisions where, although the CISG has been held applicable, domestic
provisions were applied with respect to awarding interest. See supra Part XI.
Since 14 percent of the cases we analyzed involved a Macedonian party,
this issue is not purely academic even for the FCTA practice, as one can
reasonably expect more disputes between Serbian and Macedonian parties to
be filed.  Given that the court decisions are subject to appeal, inter alia, on66
the questions of law, one is less likely to expect court decisions where
considerations of legitimate expectations would trump strictly technical
application of the Macedonian law. However, given that arbitral tribunals
receive no scrutiny on the merits, protection of parties’ legitimate expectations
might take priority before the FTCA tribunals in the years to come.
2.5.) Failure to apply the CISG where it was applicable
Overview of the FTCA case-law has shown that there were generally two
groups of cases where the CISG should have been applied, but the arbitrators
failed to do so. The first type of situation is where the facts of the case clearly
pointed to the application of the CISG, such as where there is a contract for
international sale of goods, both parties come from contracting states, and the
issue at hand was covered by the CISG, but arbitrators applied domestic
provisions of applicable laws instead.  The second group of cases deals with67
situations where it is not clear whether arbitrators resorted to the CISG or to
some other rules. In one case, the sole arbitrator simply determined Serbian
law to be applicable and later failed to disclose which particular provisions of
Serbian law he applied to resolve the dispute, Serbian LCT or the CISG.  In68
another case, the sole arbitrator in a dispute between a Bosnian and a Serbian
company noted that both countries have identical laws regulating contracts.
It was not possible to discern whether he had in mind identical provisions of
respective domestic laws, both of them emanating from the 1978 Yugoslav
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69. FTCA, Award No. T-17/05, Nov. 1, 2006. There are at least two more cases where one cannot
discern which law has actually been applied. See FTCA, Award No. T-08/01, Mar. 17, 2003; FTCA, Award
No. T-23/01, Sept. 19, 2002.
70. See also FTCA, Award No. T-19/03, June 25, 2004.
71. For the purposes of this paper we refer to the term “distribution contracts” as used in the ICC,
The ICC Model Distributorship Contract, Sole Importer-Distributor, ICC Publication No. 646 (2d ed. 2002).
72. FTCA, Award No. T-25/06, Nov. 13, 2007.
73. The contract provided, inter alia, that the Respondent undertook to resell the goods only within
certain areas of FYR Macedonia and the Claimant could rescind the contract if the reselling was directed
to other areas as well. Also, distributor (respondent) was to monitor sales on relevant markets and inform
LCT, or the identical provisions on international sales, since both countries
are parties to the CISG.69
3. Meaning of “Contract for Sale”
Arbitration practice regularly encounters contracts which elude clear-cut
classification. The CISG is, in accordance with Article 1(1), applicable to the
contracts for sale. The definition of a contract for sale is not contained in the
CISG but it can be derived from the list of essential obligations of the parties
to the contract stipulated in Articles 30 and 53 of the CISG. Article 3 further
clarifies that the CISG covers “contracts for the supply of goods to be
manufactured or produced, unless the party who orders the goods undertakes
to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or
production.” Also, if the contract is of a hybrid sales-labor/services nature, the
CISG is applicable if the labor/services component is not the preponderant
part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods.
There were several FTCA decisions in which the mixed nature of the
underlying contract had to be examined in order to determine applicability of
the CISG. For example, CISG application was correctly rejected in a case
between Serbian and Italian companies in the award number T-22/06 of
October 22, 2007. Although the underlying contract was labeled a “Contract
of Sale,” the tribunal examined the exact nature of the contract in accordance
with principle of falsa nominatio non nocet and found that the buyer had to
supply the seller with almost all materials needed for production.70
The majority of FTCA cases that posed the question of characterization
dealt with distribution contracts.  For example, in a dispute over a contract71
concluded between Macedonian and Serbian companies, the sole arbitrator
determined that the CISG was not applicable, although the parties had labeled
the contract as a contract of sale.  Examination of the parties’ rights and72
obligations revealed that they had actually concluded a distribution contract.73
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the seller-supplier (claimant) about the figures. Id.
74. CLOUT Case No. 231 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court), July 23, 1997], available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970723g1.html; CLOUT Case No. 169 [Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf
(Provincial Court of Appeal), July 11, 1996], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960711g1.html;
CLOUT Case No. 126 [Fovarosi Birosag Budapest (Metropolitan Court), Mar. 19, 1996], available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960319h1.html.
75. FTCA, Award No. T-04/05 (July 15, 2008).
76. Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law—The Experience with Uniform Sales Laws in the
Federal Republic of Germany, JURIDISK TIDSKRIFT 9 (1991), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/schlech2.html.
77. See Schlechtriem, Article 1, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 27; PETER HUBER &
ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 48 (2007)
[hereinafter CISG TEXTBOOK].
The reasoning contained observation that the CISG is not applicable to
contracts of distribution, except in the cases where the subject matter of the
dispute are individual shipments within the larger framework of the
distribution contract. This reasoning was supported by reference to foreign
court and arbitral decisions  and later confirmed in award number T-8/08 of74
January 28, 2009. This case arose from a dispute under a “Sales and
Distribution Contract” concluded between a Serbian supplier and Albanian
distributor. The facts of the case led to application of the CISG, since the
merits of the case revolved around an unpaid shipment of drugs that was made
pursuant to the sales and distribution contract. Relying on both FTCA practice
and foreign case law, the sole arbitrator held that the “CISG is applicable . . .
to individual sales transactions concluded within the framework of the
distribution contract and not to the distribution contract as a whole.”
Finally, one FTCA decision addressed the issue of whether a contract of
leasing might fall within the scope of the CISG.  Leasing contracts, as a rule,75
are not covered by the CISG.  However, there might be instances where the76
analyses of the contract provisions warrant application of the CISG.  In this77
particular FTCA case, the sole arbitrator had found that the preconditions for
CISG application were met. The dispute between a Swiss company and a
Serbian company arose out of a “Leasing Contract,” whereby the Swiss
company was to transport and install a machine, while the Serbian company
was to pay half of the contract price in advance, and the remaining half during
the five-year contract period. Once the last installment was paid, the machine
would become the property of the buyer. Although the claimant argued that
this was a lease, the sole arbitrator found that the contract was actually an
installment sale coupled with a pactum reservati dominii clause and based his
conclusion primarily on the fact that half of the price was paid in advance and
that the property would be transferred at the very moment the last installment
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78. Roder Zelt- und Hallenkonstruktionen GmbH v. Rosedown Partk Pty Ltd. (1995), 57 F.C.R. 216
(Austl.).
79. See Michael G. Bridge, The Bifocal World of International Sales: Vienna and Non-Vienna, in
MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 277, 288 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997);
Franco Ferrari, Have the Dragons of Uniform Sales Law Been Tamed? Ruminations on the CISG’s
Autonomous Interpretation by Courts, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL
BOUNDARIES, FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 134,
139–46 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008); John Honnold, The Sales Convention in
Action—Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 208 (1988); Djakhongir
Saidov, Cases on CISG Decided in the Russian Federation, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 1, 14
(2003), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov1.html.
80. See Am. Mint L.L.C. v. Gosoftware, Inc., No. 05-CV-650, 2006 WL 42090 (M.D. Pa. 2006);
St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00-CV-9344, 2002 WL 465312
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); CLOUT Case No. 230 [Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Court of Appeal), Germany,
June 25, 1997], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/draft/970625case.html; CLOUT Case No.
171 [Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), Germany, Apr. 3, 1996], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/960403g1.html; CLOUT Case No. 84 [Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Court of Appeals),
Germany, Apr. 10, 1994], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940420g1.html; CLOUT Case No.
201 [Richteramt Laufen (District Court), Switzerland, May 7, 1993], available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930507s1.html.
would be paid, i.e. that financing does not constitute a preponderant part of
seller’s obligations. Invoking the need to promote uniformity in application,
decision referred to a similar treatment of a contract labeled as leasing in one
Australian case.78
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE CISG
Determining that the application of the CISG is warranted on the basis of
the facts of the case does not in itself guarantee correct application of the
CISG. Rather, the correct application of the CISG will often depend on the
proper understanding of the operation of the provisions on interpretation of
the CISG, found in Article 7.
1. Internationality
Article 7 of the CISG requires reading the CISG through an international
lens even when expressions employed by the CISG are textually the same as
expressions which have a specific meaning within a particular legal system.
The need to interpret the CISG in an autonomous manner has been repeatedly
confirmed by doctrine  and case law.  Hence, invoking provisions of79 80
domestic law when dealing with issues governed by the CISG is completely
erroneous. Unfortunately, Serbian arbitrators have on many occasions been
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81. See, e.g., FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2008 (basing the award of interest on art. 78 CISG
and art. 278 LCT); FTCA, Award No. T-19/07, June 30, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-24/06, Dec. 1, 2007;
FTCA, Award No. T-22/05, Oct. 30, 2006 (basing the award of damages on art. 74 CISG and 275(2) LCT);
FTCA, Award No. T-18/04, May 24, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-19/99, Nov. 22, 2000.
82. See Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 687 (4th Cir. 2003);
Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995); Saidov, supra note 79, at 14.
83. See CAMILLA B. ANDERSEN, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW.
UNDERSTANDING UNIFORMITY, THE GLOBAL JURISCONSULTORIUM AND EXAMINATION AND NOTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF THE CISG 47 (2007); Michael G. Bridge, A Commentary on Articles 1–13 and 78, in
UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 32, at 235, 250; P. Cvetkoviæ, Tumaèenje ugovora o medjunarodnoj
prodaji robe: uloga naèela savesnosti i poštenja i problem “medjunarodne” interpretacije [Interpretation
of International Sales Contracts: The Role of the Good Faith Principle and the Problem of
“International” Interpretation], PRAVO I PRIVREDA Nos. 5-8/01, 966, 970–73 (2001); Ferrari, supra note
79, at 149–50; Peter Schlechtriem, Article 7, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 96–102; Harry
Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations,
Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187 (1998);
Honnold, supra note 79, at 208; V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need For Uniform Interpretation of the 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 197
(1988).
84. For the most elaborate analyses of the foreign case law, see Trib. Vigevano [Ordinary Court of
First Instance], July 12, 2000 n.405, Giur. It. 2001, II, 280 et seq. (Italy), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html (citing forty foreign decisions regarding Article 7(1) of the
CISG). See also Am. Mint L.L.C. v. Gosoftware, Inc., No. 05-CV-650, 2006 WL 42090 (M.D. Pa. 2006);
St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00-CV-9344, 2002 WL 465312
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Trib. Padova [Ordinary Court of First Instance], Feb. 25, 2004 n.40552, Giur. It. 2004,
II, 1405–08 (Italy), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html (citing forty foreign
decisions regarding Article 7(1) of the CISG); Trib. Rimini [Ordinary Court of First Instance], Nov. 11,
inclined to cite in support of their decisions not only the provisions of the
CISG, but also the provisions of the relevant national law, predominantly
Serbian LCT.  Although this kind of practice is reported in other CISG81
jurisdictions,  the CISG requires its abolishment.82
2. Uniform Application
Even the most proper determination of the need to apply the CISG would
be fruitless if the resulting application would deviate from the universal
character of the CISG. A parochial approach to decision making would in fact
fragment the message of the CISG and erode its widespread adoption.  Article83
7(1) of the CISG therefore represents a tool designed to ensure uniform
application of the CISG and foster legal certainty for parties involved in sales
transactions. Practice of foreign courts and arbitral tribunals is, therefore, a
very important yardstick against which one may gauge the correctness of his
or her own approach and the extent to which available options deviate from
the current point of consensus.84
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2002 n.3095, Giur. It. 2003, I, 896 (Italy), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html
(citing thirty five foreign decisions regarding article 7(1) of the CISG).
85. Fovárosi Biróság Budapest [Hungary] [Metropolitan Court of Budapest], No. 12 G
75.558/1994/36, Mar. 19, 1996, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960319h1.html (Hungarian
case referred to by arbitrator); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], No. VIII ZR 134/96,
July 23, 1997 (F.R.G.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970723g2.html (German case referred
to by arbitrator; German case citations do not generally identify parties to proceedings); Oberlandesgericht
Düsseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal], No. 6 U 152/95, Nov. 11, 1996 (F.R.G.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960711g1.html (German case referred to by arbitrator).
86. FTCA, Award No. T-8/08, Jan. 28, 2009.
87. Id.
88. Id.
The practice of the FTCA contains several decisions in which reference
has been made to foreign court and arbitral practice. In award number T-25/06
of November 13, 2007, the sole arbitrator used decisions of Hungarian and
German courts to support the position that the CISG is not applicable to the
distribution contracts, but only to individual sales transactions concluded
within the framework of the distribution contract.  This position was85
reaffirmed by award of January 28, 2009, invoking decisions from same
jurisdictions on the same issue.
The latter award is an ample example of FTCA’s adherence to the
mandate of Article 7(1) by quoting a total of eight foreign decisions and
arbitral awards. Besides the issue of CISG applicability to distribution
contracts, the tribunal consulted foreign case law regarding the applicability
of the CISG in a dispute involving a contract that contains a choice of law
clause. Namely, although the contract at hand called for application of “the
applicable regulations and laws of the Republic of Serbia,” the sole arbitrator
found that the CISG should be applied to the contract since it is an integral
part of Serbian law.  This finding was said to be “in accordance with the86
foreign judicial and arbitral practice, which should be taken into consideration
for the purpose of achieving uniform application of the CISG, pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the CISG.”  Specifically, the sole arbitrator noted that87
[It] has generally been held that the choice of law of the Contracting State, absent explicit
exclusion of the CISG or exercise of Article 95 reservation, means that the CISG will be
applicable [OLG Köln February 22, 1994; ICC case 7754 (1995); Tribunal of
International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, award of February 9, 2001].88
The sole arbitrator further consulted the foreign judicial and arbitral practice
when deciding on the appropriate interest rate and noted that:
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89. Id.
90. FTCA, Award No. T-4/05, July 15, 2008.
91. FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007.
92. Id.
[S]ince the matter of interest rates is governed, but not settled by the CISG, there is no
need to examine [Seller]’s request in the light of any national law, but rather examine
whether it is within the checks provided in Article 7 of the CISG. Therefore, the
proposed rate has to be determined in accordance with the principles underlying the
CISG [CLOUT cases No. 93, SCH-4366 of June 15, 1994 and No. 94 SCH-4318 of
June 15, 1994].89
In award number T-4/05 of July 15, 2008, the arbitrator referred to an
Australian court decision when deciding on the effect of a pactum reservati
dominii clause found in the disputed leasing contract to legal qualification of
the said contract. In reaching the conclusion that the sale elements of the
contract prevail, thus allowing for application of the CISG, the sole arbitrator
noted that
All of this indicates that the elements of a contract of sale are dominant over elements
akin to the characteristics of a contract of lease in this “Leasing Contract.” This position
is in accordance with foreign judicial practice, which should be taken into consideration
for the purpose of achieving uniform application of the Convention, pursuant to Article
7(1) of the Convention. For example, the Australian Federal Court for South Western
Australia . . . .90
Another case, contained the correct assessment of widely accepted
comparative practice related to the form of the notice of avoidance, i.e. that
the notice of avoidance can be derived from filing of the claim in which
avoidance is sought.  However, in this case, unlike the previously quoted91
cases, an explicit reference to particular foreign decisions was omitted.
Instead, the tribunal only noted that comparative practice is to be consulted in
accordance with Article 7(1) of the CISG.92
3. Good Faith
Article 7(1) imposes an additional obligation on the tribunals and courts
when interpreting the CISG—due regard is to be made to the need to promote
observance of good faith in international trade. The correct application of this
mandate of the CISG has been highly disputed in the legal doctrine, i.e.
whether it solely relates to the interpretation of the CISG or it imposes an
additional obligation on the parties to act in accordance with this principle in
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93. See ÆIRIÆ & DJUROVIÆ, supra note 6, at 53; Disa Sim, The Scope and Application of Good Faith
in the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 19 (Michael Maggi ed., 2004);
Troy Keily, Good Faith and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), 3 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. ARB. 15, 15–40 (1999); M. Milutinoviæ, Naèelo savesnosti i
poštenja—univerzalni princip medjunarodne trgovine [The Good Faith Principle—A Universal Principle
of International Trade], PRAVNI  ŽIVOT No. 10/2004, at 419–41; Paul J. Powers, Defining the Undefinable:
Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 J.L.
& COM. 332 passim (1999); Benedict C. Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: Interpretation Problems in
Article 7 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper, 339, 2004).
94. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Oct. 31, 2001 (F.R.G.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html (holding that parties to the sales contract are to act in
accordance with the good faith principle, i.e. that they have to cooperate with regard to the performance of
the contract and exchange relevant information).
95. See Camilla Andersen, General Principles of the CISG—Generally Impenetrable?, in SHARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H.
KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 13 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter
eds., 2008); Franco Ferrari, Interpretation of the Convention and Gap-Filling: Article 7, in UNCITRAL
DIGEST, supra note 32, at 138, 157–71; Anthony J. McMahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and
External Gaps in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed
Method for Determining “Governed by” in the Context of Article 7(2), 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 992
passim (2006).
96. CISG arts. 4–5 list some examples of matters not governed by the CISG.
the performance of the sales contract.  The FTCA has, in at least one of its93
decisions, adhered to the latter view. In award number T-9/07 of January 23,
2008, the tribunal examined the conduct of the respondent during the entire
course of the transaction and noted that respondent, as a seller
[H]as not acted in accordance with the good faith principle, which represents a
cornerstone of entire corpus of modern legislature, especially the legislative instruments
which the tribunal has identified as applicable rules in this case (CISG, Law on Contracts
and Torts, UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts and European
Principles of Contract Law).94
4. Gap-Filling
Article 7(2) of the CISG sets out a basic methodology for filling the gaps
in the CISG. The first step is to determine whether the underlying issue falls
within the lacuna praeter legem, issues to which the CISG applies but which
it does not expressly resolve, or lacuna intra legem, issues not governed by
the CISG.  If the gap is intra legem, the recourse is to be made to the law to95
which the private international law points.  However, if the gap is praeter96
legem, the CISG requires judges and arbitrators first to examine whether there
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97. CISG art. 7(2). See also Ulrich Magnus, Die allgemeinen Grundsätze im UN-Kaufrecht, 59
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 492–93 (1995) (containing the most extensive list of CISG general principles),
translated at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/magnus.html.
98. See infra Part XI.
99. See infra Part VII.2.1.
100. FTCA, Award No. T-08/08, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
090128sb.html.
are general principles underlying the CISG that could resolve the issue.  The97
resort to domestic law via means of private international law is to be regarded
as ultima ratio.
The FTCA tribunals have rarely attempted to seek for a solution of an
issue governed but not settled in the CISG within the framework of CISG
general principles. As a matter of fact, it can be stated that they have exercised
hastiness in invoking the domestic law provisions whenever an issue seemed
not to be expressly regulated by the CISG. This has been particularly
pronounced not only with respect to the issue of interest rates under the
CISG,  but also with respect to the form of the notice of non-conformity98
under Article 39(1).99
We have noted only four FTCA awards where express reference has been
made to the methodology suggested by Article 7(2) of the CISG, three of
which dealt with the issue of determination of interest rates. Award number
T-2/00 of December 9, 2002 correctly starts by listing several general
principles on which the CISG is based—bona fides, party autonomy, the
foreseeability rule, principle of cooperation, etc. However, the arbitrator then
concluded that these principles cannot serve as the basis for calculating
interest and invoked relevant provisions of Serbian law, which is the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. Award number
T-23/06 of September 15, 2008, on the other hand, makes clear reference that
the issue of interest rates for late payment should be determined on the basis
of the CISG general principles. The wording of that award suggests that the
arbitrator had the principle of full compensation in mind when determining
applicable interest rates. In a more recent award the sole arbitrator noted that
“the matter of interest rate is governed but not settled under the CISG” and
explicitly resolved the matter by invoking the principle of full compensation,
as well as the principle of prohibiting overcompensation of the creditor, which
resulted in application of “interest rate which is regularly used for savings,
such as short-term deposits in the first class banks at the place of payment
(Serbia) for the currency of payment, as this represents rate on a relatively
riskless investment.”100
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101. This decision is in accord with foreign case law. See generally Bezirksgericht Arbon (District
Court), Switzerland, Dec. 9, 1994 (CISG-online Case 376), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/941209s1.html; CLOUT Case No. 132 [Oberlandesgericht Hamm (Appellate Court), Germany,
Feb. 8, 1995], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950208g3.html; CLOUT Case No. 269
[Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court), Germany, Feb. 12, 1998], available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212g1.html; Arrondissementsrechtbank Arnhem (District Court),
Netherlands, Apr. 8, 1999 (CISG-online Case 1339), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/990408n1.html; Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Appellate Court), Germany, Jan. 25, 2008 (CISG-
online Case 1681), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080125g1.html.
102. See Jelena Peroviæ, Tumaèenje ugovora prema Konvenciji UN o medjunarodnoj prodaji robe
[Interpretation of Contracts Under the CISG], PRAVO I PRIVREDA, 864, 864–74 (2001); see also Vladimir
Stojiljkoviæ, Tumaèenje ugovora u medjunarodnoj trgovini [Interpretation of Contracts in the
International Trade], PRAVO I PRIVREDA 967, 967–73 (2000).
Article 7(2) methodology was correctly avoided in award number T-23/06
of September 15, 2008 where it was stated that the issue of assignment of
obligation to pay the price was not governed by the CISG and that it cannot
be resolved by means of applying the general principles on which the CISG
is based. Instead, the arbitrator applied the substantive law of the seller for
resolution of this issue, as required by the rules of private international law.101
The arbitrator in this case also noted that the CISG does not provide for a rule
on the nature of liability for non-payment of price where there are several
persons on the buyer’s side, i.e. whether such liability is joint or severable or
joint and severable. Hence, recourse to the domestic law was justified.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES’ STATEMENTS AND CONDUCT
Given that the provisions of the CISG are only default rules and that party
autonomy reigns supreme, finding out just what parties have actually agreed
upon is of crucial importance. According to Article 8, there are two ways to
carry out this examination: (1) by establishing the true intent of one party
where the other party knew, or could not have been unaware, of such
intention; and (2) absent indications of intent, by interpreting statements and
conduct in the way a reasonable person of the same kind would interpret them
under the same circumstances.  This standard of interpretation is of102
particular importance for those who have to apply the CISG in practice.
In award number T-8/06 of October 1, 2007, the tribunal referred to
Article 8 when interpreting correspondence of the parties subsequent to
contract conclusion and found that seller had no intention to perform any of
the contracted deliveries, and that it was obvious that all subsequent attempts
of the buyer to ensure even a belated performance have been in vain. A similar
approach was taken in the award number T-15/06 of January 28, 2008. In that
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103. FTCA, Award No. T-18/01, Nov. 27, 2002.
case, the buyer objected that the delivery was not in conformity with the
provisions of the contract and that he was not able to take over the goods. This
objection was rejected although the goods were delivered to the Subotica
(Serbia) warehouse of company X, when the contract actually called for ex
works Szeged (Hungary) delivery. The tribunal noted that the buyer was aware
that the goods were delivered to the warehouse of company X and that no
objection was raised concerning such delivery. The buyer could have had
actually taken the goods over, as all the accompanying documents had been
duly made to his name. Moreover, the buyer already undertook certain steps
in order to secure resale (re-export) of delivered goods. Therefore, on the basis
of the above mentioned elements, the tribunal concluded that the only
reasonable interpretation of the buyer’s statements and conduct is that buyer
consented to Subotica delivery and undertook what amounted to implied
acceptance of the goods in Subotica.
Another example of operation of Article 8 in the FTCA practice can be
found in the award number T-18/01 of November 27, 2002. The buyer had
resold the non-conforming, delivered goods to a third party although the seller
objected to such an action and expressed, upon buyer’s notice of non-
conformity, his willingness to take the goods back and reimburse buyer’s
storage cost. Applying Article 8(2), the sole arbitrator concluded that the
buyer’s action amounted to implied acceptance of the goods. Arbitrator noted
that buyer’s indication that “a deal has been reached to sell goods at the best
price” was in direct contravention with the seller’s express instructions to
either return the goods or pay them in full against the invoice. As for the
buyer’s contention that the parties had not been in contractual relationship at
all, the arbitrator noted that such an assertion contravenes the entire behavior
of the buyer, which included taking the goods over, allegedly objecting to
their quality, reselling the goods, and partially paying against the seller’s
invoice. The arbitrator concluded that the entirety of such behavior could not
be ascribed to a person who has not entered a contractual relationship with the
seller.103
Finally, interpretation of the party’s statements and conduct in the light
of Article 8 played an essential role in award number T-4/05 of 15 July 2008
regarding the decision on the appropriate date of contract avoidance. Despite
the fact that claimant-seller requested termination of the contract in its claim
submitted in March 2005, subsequent negotiations on contract performance
were deemed as evidence of seller’s (claimant’s) willingness to keep contract
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104. FTCA, Award No. T-4/05, July 15, 2008.
105. Id.
106. This is in line with the no-form requirement of Article 11 of the CISG. See CISG art. 11 (stating
“[a] contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses”).
107. FTCA, Award No. T-2/00, Dec. 9, 2002.
in force.  This situation changed abruptly once the seller activated court104
interim measure aimed at repossession of the delivered equipment, which
resulted in buyer’s dispossession on April 2007. The sole arbitrator concluded
that activation of the interim measure amounted to effective notice of
avoidance pursuant to Article 26 of the CISG and that, consequently, the
contract was effectively avoided at the date of the activation.105
V. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT AND FORM REQUIREMENTS
Article 29 of the CISG provides that modification of the contract is not
subject to any form requirements.  However, the second paragraph of the106
same article provides that a contract containing a no oral modification clause
may not be modified orally, although a party may be precluded by his conduct
from relying on such clause. Unfortunately, this basic principle of contract
modification under the CISG has been neglected in one FTCA award where
the initial contract was concluded in writing.
Namely, in award number T-2/00 of December 9, 2002, the disputed
contract was concluded in a written form and each page of the contract was
signed and stamped by the parties. During the arbitral proceedings, one party
alleged that parties subsequently amended the contract orally, and submitted
as evidence a telefax message in which the other party confirmed that oral
modification took place. A witness invited by the other party challenged the
authenticity of the telefax message and stated that it would be rather unusual
to amend important provisions of an international commercial contract by
telefax. Although Article 29 provides as a general rule that oral modifications
are permitted, the sole arbitrator held that:
When the parties . . . have followed rather strict requirements of form when concluding
the contract, signing and stamping each page of the document, it is clear that the function
of such form was to turn contract into a complete piece of evidence. They wanted that
only the pages certified in such manner produce legal effect, i.e. that the will of the
parties so evidenced cannot be challenged later.107
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108. See CISG arts. 49(1)(a), 51(2), 64(1)(a), 72(1), 73.
109. CISG art. 46(2).
110. See Robert Koch, The Concept of Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 177, 177–354 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed., 1999),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koch.html; Peter Schlechtriem, Article 25, in CISG
COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 281–98; PEROVIÆ, supra note 6; STOJILJKOVIÆ, supra note 6, at 156–57;
ÆIRIÆ & DJUROVIÆ, supra note 6, at 82–83; M. Milutinoviæ, Bitna povreda ugovora prema odredbama
Becke konvencije u teoriji i praksi [Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the CISG—in Theory and
Practice], PRAVO I PRIVREDA Nos. 5-8/03, 367, 367–80 (2003); A. Æiriæ & P. Cvetkoviæ, Bitna povreda
ugovora u opstim izvorima medjunarodnog privrednog ugovornog prava [Fundamental Breach of
Contract in General Sources of the Law of International Commercial Transactions] AKTUELNA PITANJA
GRADJANSKE KODIFIKACIJE, ZBORNIK RADOVA, PRAVNI FAKULTET U NIŠU 233–52 (2008).
111. Although Serbian Draft Law on Contracts and Torts, prepared by Prof. M. Konstantinoviæ, did
incorporate this institute in Art. 95, it was not kept in the final redaction of this law enacted in 1978 and
is still in force with minor changes in majority of former Yugoslav republics. The wording of Art. 95(1) of
the Draft LCT corresponds entirely to the wording of Art. 10 of the 1964 Uniform Law of International
Sales. There is no similar provision in the pertinent Serbian Law on Contracts and Torts.
This conclusion mirrors the prevailing view in interpretation of the Serbian
Law on Contracts and Torts by Serbian courts and is clearly erroneous in the
case at hand since it lacks support in both text of the CISG and relevant trade
usages.
VI. FUNDAMENTAL BREACH
Fundamental breach represents a pivotal concept in the CISG remedial
structure as it represents both a basis for avoidance of contract  and a108
precondition for the exercise of the buyer’s right to require delivery of
substitute goods.  Despite the utmost importance of this legal institute, the109
current CISG case law and scholarly commentaries have not yet succeeded in
providing sufficiently clear and foreseeable interpretation criteria.110
The majority of national laws, including the Serbian LCT, are not familiar
with the concept of fundamental breach.  Consequently, the unfamiliarity of111
Serbian lawyers with its basic requirements is not surprising. Hence, FTCA
awards in which the existence of fundamental breach was clearly established
and analyzed are extremely rare. As a matter of fact, there are only five cases
that we noted that deal expressly with this issue.
In award number T-17/02 of October 2, 2006, the sole arbitrator found
that the breach was clearly fundamental. In this case, claimant sold artificial
fishing baits to respondent pursuant to their agreement on business
cooperation: during the year 2000 only 45,816 baits were taken over and paid
out of the contracted quantity of 300,000. This amounted to roughly 15% of
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112. FTCA, Award No. T-15/06, Jan. 28, 2008.
113. In this case, Ms. X noted, on behalf of the buyer, that the quality of the delivered raspberries was
the contracted figure. In the next year, orders were even slower, falling to less
than 2% of the agreed volume. Hence, the arbitrator concluded that the breach
was fundamental and that the claimant was entitled to avoid the contract.
Although the contract at hand could have called for application of Serbian
LCT instead of the CISG as the disputed issue regarded the avoidance of the
distributorship contract as a whole, and not any of the installments made under
such contract, the case is illustrative with respect to the proportionality and the
seriousness of the breach which makes it fundamental in the eyes of the FTCA
arbitrators.
In another case, however, the tribunal did not find the breach to be
fundamental although the goods were delivered to another place, not to the
place designated in the contract, since the buyer was aware of this and was
fully capable to take possession of the goods.  Hence, the detriment suffered112
by the buyer was not deemed substantial.
Award number T-4/01 of May 10, 2002 dealt with a dispute arising out
of a contract for sale of zinc coated tin. In accordance with the contract, the
buyer made the advance payment, but the seller failed to deliver the goods in
the quantity equal to the advance payment, thus keeping a part of the advance
payment without legal basis. Once it was clear that the seller would not
perform the contract in its entirety, the buyer requested the restitution of the
advance payment in the amount corresponding to the undelivered quantity of
the goods, with domiciliary interest. The sole arbitrator granted the request on
the basis that a delivery of goods in a quantity less than contracted for and
paid for in advance amounted to fundamental breach of contract. The
arbitrator relied on Article 49 of the CISG when granting buyer’s request
without reference to Article 51, although it was clear from the facts of the case
and the holding of the award that the buyer’s right to avoid the contract was
triggered only with respect to the undelivered part of the goods. In award
number T-8/06 of October 1, 2007, the final refusal to deliver the goods was
also deemed to constitute a fundamental breach.
In award T-13/05 of January 5, 2007, the sole arbitrator found that the
seller’s breach of the contract was not fundamental since the impurities in the
goods, raspberries, were present in only 18% of the delivered raspberries.
Consequently, claimant’s request for substitute delivery was rejected. In
addition, written evidence and oral testimony was not conclusive on whether
the claimant had really made a request for substitute delivery.113
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not adequate. However, she has not requested seller to do anything particular with respect to that delivery.
Instead, she requested future deliveries to be of better quality. In addition, Y, who has performed quality
control, noted that the goods are not of the contracted quality (class A). Nevertheless, the goods were
accepted and cleared for unloading. FTCA, Award T-13/05, Jan. 5, 2007.
114. J. Peroviæ, Nesaobraznost robe kao osnov neizvrsenja ugovora o prodaji [Non-Conformity of
the Goods as Basis of Non-Performance of the Sales Contract], PRAVO I PRIVREDA Nos. 5-8/03, 332–43.
115. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Buyer’s Remedies in the Case of Non-Conforming Goods: Some Problems
in a Core Area of the CISG, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 416, 416 (2007).
116. FTCA, Award No. T-9/07, Jan. 23, 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
080123sb.html.
117. Id.
VII. NON-CONFORMITY OF THE GOODS
1. The Concept of Non-Conformity
Seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods and conditions for buyer’s
exercise of the rights in the case of non-conformity are embodied in Articles
35-44 of the CISG. These concepts are similar, although not identical to the
provisions of Serbian LCT.  The proper understanding of these provisions114
of the CISG is crucial given that more than 50 percent of all cases that have
been litigated and decided under the CISG have dealt with the issue of non-
conforming goods.115
With respect to the definition of non-conformity there have been no
controversies in the FTCA’s jurisprudence. Discrepancies in terms of both
quality and quantity of the delivered goods have regularly been found to
satisfy the non-conformity test. For example, delivery of goods of non-
Yugoslav origin, where such origin was agreed upon, constituted non-
conforming delivery.  Also, the delivery of leather of II, III and IV quality116
was regarded as non-conforming where the contract required delivery of I, II
and III class of leather.  The same principle was applied with respect to117
delivery of non-conforming documents. For example, in award number T-9/07
of January 23, 2009, the tribunal correctly noted that the seller, under the
CISG, apart from the goods “must provide the buyer [here claimant] with the
specified documents in regard to the goods.” Hence the delivery of non-
conforming document constituted seller’s breach of contract.
In award number T-10/04 of November 6, 2005, a German buyer invoked
against a Serbian seller the non-conformity of goods with respect to the labels
on the packaging of the bottles of mineral water. Namely, under the
regulations of the country of import, Germany, all labels on the bottles of
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118. This finding is in line with the established principles on when the conformity to public law
requirements of the buyer’s country is required. See CLOUT Case No. 123 [Bundesgerichshof, Germany,
May 8, 1995]; CLOUT Case No. 774 [Bundesgerichshof, Germany, Mar. 2, 2005]; CLOUT Case No. 426
[Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, Apr. 13, 2000].
119. This is prescribed by Arts. 38 and 39 CISG, but could be overridden to some extent if the
requirements of Arts. 40 or 44 are met. In any event, the examination of the goods is not, per se, relevant
for the buyer’s exercise of remedies for non-conformity. However, it is an important step to be taken by the
buyer within the prescribed time period since it may impact the calculation of the “reasonable time” for
giving notice of non-conformity under article 39. Similar, although not identical, obligations are prescribed
in the Serbian LCT Arts. 481, 484. However, these two texts differ in respect to the required time-frame
within which the notice of non-conformity has to be given, and form and contents of such notice. Under
the LCT the buyer is obliged to inspect the goods as soon as possible and to notify the seller of the defects
without delay (in a non-commercial setting within 8 days). In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on
the lack of conformity if he does not give notice within 6 months after delivery of the goods, unless a longer
time period has been agreed upon by the parties. Regarding the form of such notice, although the provisions
of Serbian LCT Art. 484(1) do not contain an explicit reference as to the form of notice of non-conformity,
and the law itself is generally based on the principle of consensualism, interpretation of this provision in
the commercial setting has been such as to require written (reliable) form of notice. This view has been
affected by the 1954 General Usages for Turnover of Goods which in Art. 152 explicitly require notice of
non-conformity to be sent in a “reliable way” and any notice given over the telephone, telegram or
teleprinter to be immediately confirmed by means of registered mail. This is further supported by the fact
mineral water had to contain printed information about the company of the
importer and distributor, accompanied with other prescribed data. Instead of
providing data about the buyer’s company, the labels on the delivered bottles
contained information about another German company to whom the seller has
also exported goods. As a consequence, the buyer was prevented from placing
the goods in circulation. The arbitrator correctly noted that such delivery was
non-conforming, given that seller was aware of German labeling requirements
as it already traded with companies from Germany and complied to said
requirements with respect to his other business partners.  However, the buyer118
was prevented from exercising any of his rights under the Convention since
the notice of non-conformity was not duly made, it was addressed to the
representative of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce instead of being
addressed to the seller!
2. Notice of Non-Conformity
Exercise of buyer’s rights in the case of non-conforming goods proved to
be one of the more interesting issues in the reviewed FTCA case law. Under
the CISG, the buyer may invoke non-conformity of the goods against the seller
only if he examined the goods as soon as practicable and notified the seller on
non-conformity within a reasonable time, specifying the nature of the lack of
conformity.  Given that only the correct exercise of these formalities gives119
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that Serbian LCT Art. 484(2) regulates the consequences of late arrival or lost notification of defects sent
in a reliable way, thus implying, according to the majority opinion, that oral notices of defects are not
sufficient under Serbian law. As to the contents of such notice, the LCT requires specificity of such notice
in the same manner as does the CISG. However, the LCT further requires in Article 484(1), as did the 1964
ULIS Art. 39(2), that the buyer has to invite the seller to inspect the goods.
120. See CISG art. 11.
121. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 39, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 465. See also CISG-
AC Opinion No. 2, Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity: Articles 38 and 39, June 7,
2004, available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=144&sid=144.
122. Despite the fact that panel’s analysis of the form requirements under CISG art. 39 was erroneous,
this did not impact the tribunal’s finding since the written form of the notice was required by the contract
and buyer complied with such requirement. FTCA, Award No. T-09/01, Feb. 23, 2004.
123. See also FTCA, Award No. T-10/04, Nov. 6, 2005.
rise to buyer’s unrestricted use of remedies in the case of non-conforming
delivery, the correct interpretation of Article 39(1) of the CISG is essential for
buyer’s protection in such case.
2.1.) Form of notice
The CISG does not explicitly prescribe formal requirements for the notice
of non-conformity. Pursuant to Article 7(2) and the general principle of
consensualism on which the CISG is based,  one can easily discern that no120
particular form is required for such notice and that oral notice would be
sufficient to meet the conditions laid out in Article 39.  Proving that the oral121
notification has actually been made is, of course, another matter.
In the Serbian context, however, there is a rather unusual potential
obstacle to a correct application of Article 39(1), namely the Yugoslav (Serbo-
Croatian) official translation of the CISG is not precise enough. This was
reflected in FTCA award number T-09/01 of February 23, 2004. Faced with
the question of validity of notice of non-conformity, the tribunal held that the:
[CISG] does not prescribe form requirements explicitly. However, given that [the notice]
has to be sent and [given] its contents, written form is the only logical solution. It is a
standard practice in foreign trade transactions that objections are sent in writing and that
any oral objection has to be immediately evidenced in writing. Since this matter is not
settled by the CISG, Serbian Law on Contracts and Torts should fill the gaps, given that
the provisions of the Private International Law Act direct to its application. LCT states
that notice of non-conformity containing description of the defect has to be sent by
registered mail, telegram or by any other reliable means.122
A similar result was reached in award number T-18/01 of November 27,
2002, where the sole arbitrator concluded that written form of notice was
necessary.  He noted that the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly123
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124. FTCA, Award No. T-15/04, Feb. 21, 2005 (emphasis added).
125. See supra note 109.
heard phone conversation in a foreign language, cannot represent a credible
proof that the notice of non-conformity was given and that the buyer simply
had to confirm such oral notice in writing within a reasonable time. Finally,
in award number T-15/04 of February 21, 2005 the sole arbitrator, besides
holding that the notice was not given within appropriate period also
questioned the validity of oral notices by stating “even if the phone
conversation could have been regarded as a notice of defects, such notice was
not given within reasonable time.”124
To a Serbian lawyer, examination of the abovementioned awards reveals
that the initial misinterpretation of the CISG stemmed from the faulty
translation it received when it was incorporated in Yugoslav legislation. The
requirement of Article 39 that a buyer has to ‘give notice’ had been translated
in a manner which suggested that notice had to be ‘sent’ (“pošalje
obaveštenje” in Serbian). To a Serbian reader, this might suggest that
notification has to be conducted in a manner and through a medium which
allows for “sending” in the classical written form. This initial hint was further
reinforced once the arbitrators abandoned looking for solutions in the CISG
general principles and resorted to interpretations in light of domestic
legislation and court practice.  International commercial usages might have125
been used as a tool to circumvent consensuality, but that could have been done
only through Article 9 of the CISG, and by proving the widespread use of the
written form of notices in international trade practice, outside of Serbia, or at
least by proving the existence of such practice between the parties. However,
no similar attempts have been made. To the contrary, it seems that in the first
case a shortcut was taken and Serbian legal practice was simply substituted for
usage. Luckily, such distortion did not affect the outcome of the second
case—the award makes it clear that the testimony on which the buyer relied
to prove that seller was given notice would not have convinced the arbitrator
even if he held that notification required no special form.
In conclusion, the analyzed awards evidence a firm position in the FTCA
practice that Article 39(1) of the CISG requires written form of notice. Since
the main cause of such position is the erroneous translation of Article 39(1)
of the CISG to Serbian, the most effective way to overcome its continuous
application in the FTCA practice would be to amend the language of the Law
on Ratification of the CISG. However, given that such procedure would be
rather complicated, it seems that the only plausible way to change the
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126. Such an approach has already been utilized in the decision of CLOUT Case No. 885
[Schweizerishces Bundesgericht (BGer) (Federal Court), Switz., Nov. 13, 2003] (“The UN Sales Law was
drafted in Arabic, English, French, Spanish, Russian and Chinese. It was also translated into German,
among other languages. In the case of ambiguity in the wording, reference is to be made to the original
versions, whereby the English version, and, secondarily, the French version are given a higher significance
as English and French were the official languages of the Conference and the negotiations were
predominantly conducted in English.”), translated at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031113s1.html. The
mistake in German translation of the Convention that this Court addressed regards the specificity of the
notice of non-conformity required under Article 39(1) of the CISG. Id. (holding that a higher degree of
specificity is required for German text in comparison to English and French texts), translated at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031113s1.html. The use of English text of the Convention instead of its
faulty translation to the language of the CISG member state was evidenced in the FTCA practice itself in
FTCA, Award No. T-4/05, July 15, 2008 (regarding Article 1 in context of Article 10, i.e. translation of the
English phrase “place of business” to Serbian phrase meaning “seat”).
127. See CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 121.
128. Id. at 121, at cmt. 4. See also CLOUT Case No. 319 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme
Court), Germany, Nov. 3, 1999], available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991103g1.html.
129. See Rechtbank van Koophandel, Kortrijk [District Court] Belgium, Dec. 16, 1996, available
at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=340&step=FullText.
130. Trib. Vigevano [Ordinary Court of First Instance], July 12, 2000 n.405, Giur. It. 2001, II, 280
et seq. (Italy), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html.
131. Landesgericht Köln [Trial Court] Germany, Nov. 30, 1999, available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=799&step=FullText.
interpretation of Article 39(1) in Serbian practice is in raising the awareness
of the Serbian legal community and FTCA arbitrators, in particular, of such
errors in translation and recommending interpretation of the CISG in light of
the formulations used in one of its authentic texts (Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish)  in accordance with the 1969 Vienna126
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which Serbia is a party, and the
prevailing interpretation in foreign case-law and scholarly work, evidenced,
inter alia, in the CISG-AC Opinion No. 2.127
2.2.) Content of notice
According to Article 39(1), notice must “specify the nature of the lack of
conformity.” According to the relevant case law and CISG-AC Opinion No.
2, the level of specificity should not be exaggerated. Namely, it is not always
necessary to describe the nature and cause of the problem: pointing out the
“symptoms” may be sufficient.  Otherwise, a buyer would carry a heavy128
burden of dissecting specific problems of non-conformity in matters where he
lacks technical knowledge. However, laconic notices such as “bad quality,”129
“[the goods] caused some problems,”  or “[the goods] were not labeled130
according to the schedule of items”  are deemed insufficient. This is because131
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132. Harry Flechtner, Buyer’s Obligation to Give Notice of Non-Conformity, in UNCITRAL DIGEST,
supra note 32, at 384–88; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 39, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra 20, at 462.
133. FTCA, Award No. T-16/99, Feb. 12, 2001.
134. See Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records, 1st comm., 16th mtg., A/Conf.97/19
(Mar. 20, 1980).
135. CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 121 (discussing the disparate periods which have been
regarded as noncompliant with the reasonableness requirement among the awards listed in the annex).
136. CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, supra note 121, at cmt. 3.
137. See Schwenzer, supra note 132, at 467.
138. German courts, for example, appear to regard a one month period as reasonable. See CLOUT
the purpose of the notice is to allow seller to cure the defect, or collect and
secure evidence regarding the conformity of goods and perform other
activities which might help him later in protecting his rights against his
suppliers.132
Having all this in mind, it can be concluded that award number T-18/01
of November 27, 2002 arrived at the correct conclusion that notice has to be
devoid of any doubts and contain description of the lack of conformity. The
sole arbitrator found, stating that poultry’s rate of reproduction decreased,
while at the same time their mortality rate increased, that the communication
was precise enough to represent a proper notice of non-conformity under the
contract for sale of poultry. On the same line, another tribunal was correct in
finding that a buyer’s notice that significant portions of delivered leather
pieces were discarded during production of the leather items was
inadequate.  It would have been proper to explain that the goods delivered133
were of classes II, III and IV, instead of the contracted classes I, II and III, as
buyer had done later in the proceedings.
2.3.) Reasonable time
Article 39(1) provides that notice has to be made within a “reasonable
time” after a defect is discovered or ought to be discovered. This standard was
fiercely debated during the CISG drafting process  and still represents one134
of the most controversial issues in court and arbitral practice.  According to135
CISG-AC Opinion No. 2,  the length of this period has to be determined on136
a case by case basis, taking into account all the circumstances, and should not
be linked to any fixed periods prescribed by national laws.  Unless the137
parties have agreed on such period in advance, this usually boils down to
examination of the circumstances of the case, with special emphasis to the
nature of the goods, the nature of the defect, the situation of the parties,
relevant trade usages, and practices established between the parties.138
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319 [Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Germany, Nov. 3, 1999]; CLOUT Case No. 289
[Obrelandesgericht Stuttgart (District Court), Germany, Aug. 21, 1995].
139. FTCA, Award No. T-15/04, Feb. 21, 2005.
140. FTCA, Award No. T-21/06, Aug. 29, 2008.
141. See Stoll & Gruber, Article 74, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 750; CISG TEXTBOOK,
supra note 77, at 256; HONNOLD, supra note 10, at 297; Joseph M. Lookofsky, Fault and No-Fault in
Danish, American and International Sales Law: The Reception of the United Nations Sales Convention,
27 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 109, 130 (1983).
142. FTCA, Award No. T-14/07, May 23, 2008.
FTCA award number T-18/01 of November 27, 2002 dealt with the notice
of non-conformity which was given 16 days after the goods were taken over.
There the arbitrator found that such a period was not timely and not in
accordance with Article 39 of the CISG. He noted that such period might have
been reasonable under different circumstances, but the perishable nature of the
goods, fresh mushrooms, meant that notice had to be made at an earlier point
in time. In another case, the sole arbitrator found that a notice given three
months after the goods, poultry, were received was not timely.  In a more139
recent case, failure to send notification within one month after delivery of the
goods, again poultry, precluded the buyer from asserting his rights based on
non-conformity.  Finally, in award number T-09/01 of February 23, 2004 the140
wording of Article 39 was erroneously paraphrased to require notice of non-
conformity to be sent “without delay.” This mistake, however, did not cause
the buyer’s loss of rights for non-conformity since he sent notice of non-
conformity in a timely manner.
VIII. NO-FAULT LIABILITY
It has often been said that, unlike many national laws, the CISG’s
remedial system is based on the concept of no-fault liability.  This141
contention has been confirmed by FTCA practices as well. For example in
award number T-14/07 of May 23, 2008, the arbitrator rejected the buyer’s
reasons for non-payment of the price. The arbitrator stated:
The debtor is liable for his monetary obligations in those cases when he is left without
financial means without his fault, for example, if his debtors have failed to pay him the
amounts owed, as in the case at hand. Hence, the buyer is obliged to pay the price even
where it is not his fault that he is unable to do so. This is because such non-payment
represents a breach of contract.142
42 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 28:1
143. See art. 126(2) LCT.
144. Milena Djordjeviæ, Naknadni rok za izvršenje ugovora prema odredbama Beèke konvencije
[Fixing an Additional Period of Time for Contract Performance Under the CISG], 11 PRAVNI  ŽIVOT 259,
259–77 (2003).
145. See art. 126(1) LCT and art. 127 LCT.
146. See art. 126(3) and art. 125(1–2) LCT.
IX. AVOIDANCE
According to Articles 45 and 61 of the CISG, in case of breach of
contract, the aggrieved party may, inter alia, avoid the contract. Contrary to
the view sometimes expressed in Serbian court practice that there is little
difference when it comes to the contents of the CISG and the LCT, the
conditions for avoidance of contract, as well as the manner of exercising the
right to avoid the contract differ significantly between these two legal
instruments. Hence, we shall pay a special emphasis to these differences.
1. Basis of Avoidance
Aside from avoidance based on mutual consent of the parties, there are
two major bases for contract avoidance under the CISG: (1) the existence of
fundamental breach; and (2) non-delivery or non-performance of buyer’s
obligation to pay the price or take delivery of the goods within the additional
period of time fixed by the other party in accordance with Articles 47(1) and
63(1) (Nachfrist notice).
As has been previously mentioned, the concept of fundamental breach is
novel for Serbian lawyers. Hence, there are not many awards that elaborate on
this issue. The ones that do have already been covered in section VII of this
paper.
On the other hand, fixing an additional period of time for contract
performance and avoiding the contract upon expiry of such a period is a well
established institute in Serbian contract law.  However, its importance and143
effect differ from the provisions of the CISG.  First, giving notice of144
additional time for performance to the defaulting party is a condition sine qua
non for the exercise of the right to avoid under Serbian law, except for fixed-
time contract and for situations where it is clear from the circumstances of the
case that the debtor will not perform even within the additional period of
time.  Second, upon expiry of this period the contract is avoided ipso facto,145
unless the aggrieved party notifies without delay the debtor that he is still
interested in contract performance.  Finally, unlike the CISG, Serbian law146
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147. See art. 133 LCT; FTCA, Award No. T-10/07, Dec. 3, 2008 (dealing with a party’s request for
avoidance of contract on the basis of changed circumstances since the party’s bank account was blocked
and he could not get a loan from the bank). Unfortunately, the award in this case is of little value for this
study since the tribunal erred by applying the Serbian LCT instead of the CISG, although its application
was warranted since the parties agreed on Serbian law to be applicable to their contract, which should
include the CISG, as already elaborated in section II.2.1. of this paper.
148. FTCA, Award No. T-04/05, July 15, 2008 (“The evidence suggests that the parties have
negotiated on the performance of the Contract even after the Statement of Claim was submitted. The
consequence of these negotiations is a “Statement” signed by Mr. X, the owner of the [Buyer] . . . on
October 7, 2005, in which he promised to pay all due sums under the Contract by January 31, 2006. This
additional period of nearly four months represents a reasonable and clear time period within the meaning
of Article 63(1) of the Convention, by which the [Buyer] was given an additional period of time for
performance of its obligations.”).
149. Id. (“At the meeting of September 15, 2006, Ms. Y, the [consultant at the Serbian subsidiary of
Seller], informed the [Buyer] that the [Seller] would help the [Buyer] by postponing the execution of the
provisional measure if the [Buyer] pays its obligations in an additional period of two weeks—by
September 30, 2006. The [Buyer] was thereby clearly informed that the [Seller] would commence
enforcement of the provisional measure after the expiration of this period, which would make the Contract
effectively avoided.”).
recognizes the possibility of the contract avoidance on the basis of changed
circumstances.147
The avoidance of contract on the basis of Nachfrist notice was addressed
in only one of the analyzed FTCA decisions. In award number T-4/05 of
July 15, 2008, the parties’ settlement of October 7, 2005 on the buyer’s
payment of the price by January 31, 2006 was considered to be an effective
notice of performance of the buyer within the additional period of time of four
months fixed therein.  Arguably the settlement did not in fact constitute a148
Nachfrist notice within the meaning of Article 63(1), since the Nachfrist
notice does not represent a unilateral action, but rather an agreed extension of
the date for performance. Instead, seller’s statement of September 15, 2006
that he would postpone enforcement of a provisional measure entitling him to
repossession of the goods from the buyer for two weeks was probably the real
Nachfrist notice in the mentioned case, since this statement contained all the
necessary contents required from the Nachfrist notice: specificity of the time-
period; and serious intentions as to the avoidance and reasonableness of the
length of the set period.  However, the final outcome of this case seems just149
since the arbitrator found the contract was avoided on April 16, 2007, more
than 14 months after the expiry of the first Nachfrist notice and more than six
months from expiry of the second notice containing cut-off date for
performance.
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150. See Serbian LCT art. 125(1) (involving cases of fixed-time contracts); Serbian LCT art. 126(3)
(involving cases of non-performance within an additional period of time for performance).
151. See CISG art. 26; J. Peroviæ, Izjava o raskidu ugovora kao uslov za raskid ugovora zbog
neispunjenja obaveze [Declaration of Avoidance as a Condition for Avoidance of Contract for Non-
Performance], PRAVNI ŽIVOT No. 11/05, 473–97 (2005) (Serbia).
152. Rainer Hornung, Article 26, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 302–03.
153. CLOUT Case No. 6 [Landgericht Frankfurt a.M. (District Court), Germany, Sept. 16, 1991].
2. Declaration of Avoidance
Unlike the Serbian LCT which recognizes ipso facto avoidance in certain
cases,  the CISG always requires avoidance to be effectuated by means of a150
declaration of avoidance, i.e. notice to the other party.  Given that151
determination of the exact time of contract avoidance may have significant
consequences to the rights and obligations of the parties, e.g. calculation of
damages on the bases of cover transaction under Article 75 is contingent on
such transaction taking place after avoidance of contract or determination of
the market price at the time of contract avoidance for the purposes of
calculation of damages under Article 76, this question is of utmost
importance.
The CISG requires no form as to the declaration of avoidance. An explicit
declaration is, of course, sufficient, but so can an implied notification, i.e.
notification by conduct.  The essential requirement is that the notice to the152
party in breach unambiguously manifest that the other party does not wish to
be further bound by the contract.153
Issues of avoidance of a contract and the form of declaration of avoidance
were raised in award number T-8/06 of October 1, 2007, dealing with a
contract concluded between Serbian and Romanian companies. Claimant-
buyer wrote to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Romania and Ministry of
Public Information of Romania asking them to urge respondent-seller to return
the sums he received as the advance payment. No explicit statement was at
that time directed to the buyer himself, hence, such conduct was not deemed
sufficient to constitute valid declaration of avoidance. However, taking into
account comparative judicial and arbitral practice on Article 26 of the CISG,
without express reference to it, but with reference to a mandate from Article
7(1), the tribunal concluded that only filing a claim before arbitration was
sufficient to constitute a proper declaration of avoidance since the statement
of claim contained a declaration that claimant considered the contract to be
terminated. The tribunal found such language sufficiently clear and
unambiguous to meet the requirements of Article 26 of the CISG.
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154. See FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/071001sb.html; FTCA, Award No. T-02/00, Dec. 9, 2002.
Award T-4/05 of July 15, 2008 pushed the moment of avoidance even
further—after the claim was submitted. In that case, claimant-seller delivered
a machine and respondent-buyer did not pay the price in full. Claimant
submitted its claim to arbitration, requesting “to terminate the contract.”
However, even after the claim was lodged, the parties were negotiating about
possible ways in which the respondent might fulfill its obligations. The first
result of those negotiations was a declaration signed by the Respondent, which
stated that he would settle his debt by January 31, 2006, within less than four
months. However, respondent did not act on his promise. Although, according
to the tribunal, the claimant had every right to declare the contract avoided
upon expiry of this period, it did not do so until April 2007. During this time
fruitless negotiations occurred, empty promises were exchanged, and claimant
managed to obtain a court interim measure on March 15, 2005 aimed at
repossession of the delivered equipment which, pursuant to a pactum reservati
dominii clause, was still the property of claimant. Claimant waited until April
2007 to activate such measure, and the arbitrator treated activation of the
measure and subsequent dispossession of the buyer as effective notice of
avoidance pursuant to Article 26 of the CISG.
3. Effects of Avoidance
According to Article 81, avoidance of contract releases both parties from
their obligations, subject to damages which might be due. Normally this
presupposes a symmetrical restitution, whereby both parties are supposed to
return concurrently what they have received pursuant to contract performance.
In several FTCA awards, this provision was applied in a straightforward and
expected manner.  However, award number T-4/05 raised another interesting154
issue. In this case, once the contract was declared avoided, only one of the
parties, claimant-seller, requested return of what he gave under the contract,
a machine. The other party, although it participated in the proceedings, did not
at any time request restitution, and the arbitrator took a restrained attitude with
respect to such position. Consequently, while ordering restitution pursuant to
Article 81(1), the arbitrator noted that his jurisdiction was limited only to
requests that parties have actually made, and that stepping over the line would
constitute a violation of the non ultra petita principle and render the award
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155. See art. 266(1) LCT.
156. FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
071001sb.html.
157. Id.
partially unenforceable. This resulted in a one-sided restitution only, whereby
partial payment for the returned goods was kept by the claimant.
X. DAMAGES
The right to damages for breach of contract is an essential right of both
the seller and buyer under the CISG Articles 45 and 61. It is available as an
independent remedy and concurrently with other remedies, such as avoidance.
The basic preconditions for its exercise are contained in Article 74 of the
CISG, whereas the special methods for calculation of damages in case of
contract avoidance can be derived from Articles 75-76. Article 77 contains an
important limitation to recovery of damages by allowing reduction in damages
by the amount the loss sustained should have been mitigated by the aggrieved
party.
Unsurprisingly, the request for damages has often been raised in the
FTCA practice. This survey will not represent an extensive analysis of all the
damages awards in FTCA practice. Rather, it will provide an overview of
some of the issues tackled by the FTCA and point to the major differences in
assessment of damages under the CISG and Serbian LCT.
1. Categories of Loss
Article 74 states that the damages for breach of contract shall consist of
“a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party
as a consequence of the breach.” So the CISG endows recovery of both
“actual damage” (lat. damnum emergens) and “lost profit” (lat. lucrum
cessans), as also provided by the Serbian LCT.  While the types of losses155
recoverable, other than those falling within the two above mentioned
categories, are not specified, it is clear that the basic prerequisite for recovery
of damages is that the loss is a consequence of the breach. In the FTCA
practice, the following types of losses have been deemed recoverable: travel
expenses by buyer’s employees in connection with the conclusion and
performance of the sales contract;  interest for acquiring a bank loan for the156
advance payment of the price;  customs, VAT, and other expenses incurred157
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2008; FTCA, Award No. T-18/07, Oct. 15, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-01/08, Nov. 17, 2008; FTCA,
Award No. T-05/08, Jan. 5, 2009.
163. FTCA, Award No. T-09/07, Jan. 23, 2008, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/080123sb.html.
164. See CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74, Rapporteur:
Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA cmt. 2.2.
as a result of seller’s breach of contract;  administrative penalties;  costs158 159
of opening the letter of credit;  etc.160
The controversial issue of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs of procedure
as damages  has not been addressed, since the request for such an award was161
always made separately from the request for damages.  However, the costs162
of legal representation and the costs of proceedings incurred before a different
institution, e.g. tax organs, as a consequence of the seller’s breach of contract,
have been awarded by the FTCA tribunals as damages.163
2. Proof of Damages
It goes without saying that damages have to be proven in order to be
recovered.  This rule is also sustained by the CISG, with the exception of164
Article 76, which allows for recovery of “abstract damages” provided that the
conditions contained therein are fulfilled.
The issue of proof of damages was addressed in several FTCA decisions
and recovery of damages was denied in all the cases where claimants were not
in a position to prove the loss. For example, in award number T-4/05,
claimant-seller requested avoidance of the contract, repossession of the goods,
and compensation for respondent-buyer’s use of the goods for several years,
48 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 28:1
165. FTCA, Award No. T-8/06, Oct. 1, 2007.
166. See Franco Ferrari, Comparative Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages in Contract
Law, 53 LA. L. REV. 1257, 1257–69 (1993); Stoll & Gruber, supra note 141, at 763–69; Djakhongir Saidov,
Methods of Limiting Damages under the Vienna Sales Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(2001), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/saidov.html.
167. This requirement exists under Serbian law as well. Serbian LCT art. 266(1). However, Serbian
law differs from the CISG in that respect that the foreseeability of the loss is not a limitation to the amount
of recoverable damages in case of fraudulent, willful or grossly negligent breach of contract. Serbian LCT
art. 266(2).
claiming lost profits and amortization. Claimant’s request for damages was
rejected on the grounds that claimant did not prove such damages. In other
cases, the recovery was awarded up to the amount proven by the aggrieved
party or the expert witness’ calculation. For example, in award number T-8/06
of October 1, 2007 buyer’s request for recovery of an interest paid on a loan
from a bank for securing the necessary funds for advance payment under the
sales contract was only partially granted. Having examined the evidence
presented by the buyer, the tribunal determined that
[T]he interest on the borrowed amount was not running after the date of repayment of the
loan (February 1, 2004) until March 31, 2006 (being the calculation date used by the
expert in her opinion). Therefore, the Tribunal refused [Buyer]’s claim for compensation
of direct damage on this ground, because only the interest actually paid to the bank could
be recognized as direct damage.165
3. Foreseeability
Similar to many national legislations,  the CISG requires damages166
arising out of a contractual relationship to be foreseeable in order to be
recoverable.167
In award number T-8/06 of October 1, 2007, buyer’s claim for actual
damages had two components: the costs of daily allowances and transportation
costs that the buyer incurred in relation to the business visits to the seller; and
the interest buyer had to pay in order to service the bank loan he took to pay
the advance on the contract price to the seller. The tribunal found that both
types of damages were foreseeable to the seller, including the interest rate of
the bank loan.
As to the first portion of the damages award, the tribunal noted that they
were foreseeable since it is:
[C]ommon in business practice that [Buyer] would attempt to negotiate with [Seller] the
subsequent performance of the contract in case of non-performance of the delivery under
it. This conclusion is especially justified having in mind that the correspondence between
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171. See FTCA, Award No. T-8/06 at 8.2, Oct. 1, 2007 (“The Arbitral Tribunal determined that the
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the time of conclusion of the sales contract could not have foreseen, nor were there any circumstances
which would cause the [Seller] to foresee, that the [Buyer], as a reseller, had concluded a contract of sale
of the timber for the total quantity of 10,000 m  of poplar. This conclusion is supported by the provisions3
of the Sales Contract, which provides for several deliveries, with each delivery being triggered by the
[Buyer] by making the advance payment for the respective delivery. This indicates that at the time of the
conclusion of the sales contract the whole quantity of poplar could not have been envisaged for processing
and reselling to specific subsequent buyers. The [Buyer] only proved that it had contracted to sell 40 m  of3
timber (a minimal quantity even in respect of the first delivery of 1.538 m  of poplar), thereby not meeting3
the condition for awarding loss of profit.”).
the parties indicates that [Seller] had suggested to [Buyer] that he would subsequently
perform the first delivery.168
With respect to the second portion of the damages award, the tribunal
found that:
[Seller] at the time of conclusion of the contract could have presumed that [Buyer] would
obtain a loan from a bank for securing the necessary funds for the advance payment under
the sales contract, since it is a well known and established business practice that
companies secure necessary funds by borrowing money from banks . . . . Hence, [Seller]
ought to have foreseen that [Buyer] would suffer damage in the amount equal to the
interest on the amount borrowed from the bank, from the moment in which the advance
payment has been made until the repayment of the loan. Consequently, [Seller] is obliged
to compensate [Buyer] for the damage suffered.169
In addition, the buyer was awarded lost profits since the tribunal
concluded that seller could have foreseen that the goods ordered, planks, were
purchased so that the buyer could manufacture goods for sale to third parties.
The arbitral tribunal found that:
[Seller] could have foreseen that [Buyer] was purchasing the poplars for the purpose of
their processing and reselling, and that [Buyer] had contracted for the resale of the
quantity for which the advance payment was made. Therefore, the condition of
foreseeability for awarding damages pursuant to Article 74 of the [CISG] is met.170
However, the amount of damages awarded on this basis was limited only to
the amount of lost profit corresponding to the quantity of a resale agreement
concluded by the buyer with the third party.  Although the tribunal was171
correct in not awarding the claimant further damages for loss of profit, it erred
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in relying on non-foreseeability of claimant’s claim. In doing so the tribunal
contradicted its previous finding that buyer’s purpose of further processing
and resale of poplars was foreseeable to the seller. However, the true and valid
reason for denying buyer’s claim for future loss of profits in this case was his
omission to prove that any future profit would be lost. The only proof
submitted by the buyer was a contract for the planks, and the quantity ordered
was minuscule, not only with respect to the total amount of timber to be
delivered, but also with respect to the actual amount of timber delivered
before avoidance of the contract.
In a case involving a contract for sale of sugar,  the tribunal correctly172
concluded that respondent, as a professional trader, could have foreseen that
shipment of sugar, which did not conform to the specifications of the contract,
Yugoslav origin, 2002 harvest, could result in damages for the claimant in the
amount of customs and other expenses to be paid, given that the origin of the
goods was crucial in getting a zero-duty customs treatment.  The tribunal173
expressly stated that, in regard to the evidentiary material in this case:
[It] had no dilemma whether [Seller] knew or could have known that in Italy sugar is
imported under a favored treatment and that there is a financial consequence for [Buyer]
if [Seller] does not deliver goods which are in conformity with the conditions of the
contract, especially in regard to the origin and the type of harvest.174
4. Liquidated Damages
The analysis of the FTCA practice confirms the view that recovery under
liquidated damages clauses is permissible under the CISG and subject only to
limitations of the public policy requirements of the applicable national law.175
In the words of award number T-4/05 of July 15, 2008:
[The CISG] does not contain any provisions which could be applied to this legal
question, but the principle of party autonomy (Article 6 of the Convention) enables the
parties to stipulate freely the amount of compensation to be paid by the debtor to the
creditor in case of non-performance or untimely performance of the contractual
obligation, as is the case here. The validity of this clause is not contested by the Law of
Contracts and Torts of the Republic of Serbia, which is based on the same principle
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176. FTCA, Award No. T-4/05, July 15, 2008.
177. See CISG art. 78 (setting the basis for a party’s entitlement to interest if the other party fails to
pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears). Article 78 also makes it clear that the interest can be
sought under the general damages rule in Article 74 of the CISG (provided that the preconditions for its
application are met); see also CISG art. 84(1) (specifying the date of accrual of restitutionary interest if the
seller is bound to refund the price).
178. The buyer was awarded interest on the amount borrowed from the bank in order to make an
advance payment as damages. FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007 (“By inspecting the loan agreement
that [Buyer] had concluded with the [Bank], the Arbitral Tribunal found that the [Buyer] was to pay interest
under that contract at the rate of 12% annually on the amount granted for making the advance payment, and
made the decision on compensation of the direct damage by applying the interest rate actually paid.
Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal granted the [Buyer]’s claim for compensation of direct damage in the
amount of the interest paid on the amount the [Buyer] had borrowed from the bank to make the advance
payment to the [Seller], as of the date of making the advance payment (July 3, 2002) until the date of
repayment of the loan (Feb. 1, 2004) at the rate of 12% annually, which was stipulated in the loan contract
(EUR 2,948.62).”), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071001sb.html.
179. Although FTCA Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/071001sb.html, dealt with the issue of a price refund upon avoidance of a contract, no reference was
made to Article 84(1) CISG and the same interest rate was applied both to the amount sought as repayment
of the price and to the amount claimed as damages.
180. The views are not only divided as to whether the issue of interest rate is lacuna intra legem or
lacuna praeter legem, but also as to how, if it is lacuna praeter legem, to resolve it. See Francesco G.
Mazzotta, CISG Article 78: Endless Disagreement Among Commentators, Much Less Among the Courts
(2004), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mazzotta78.html; Alan F. Zoccolillo, Determination of
Interest Rate Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
(Article 10 of the Law on Contracts and Torts), and these provisions could not be held
contrary to the imperative norms, public policy or customs.176
XI. INTEREST
Most of the claims revolve around money, and the cost for use of
money—interest—invariably comes into picture. Hence, it is not surprising
that almost every case we researched for this article dealt with the issue of
determining the appropriate interest rate. There are three articles in the CISG
that deal directly or indirectly with the issue of awarding interest: Articles 74,
78 and 84(1).  Given that the examined FTCA awards have shown only one177
example where the interest was awarded as damages, under Article 74,  and178
no example where Article 84(1) was explicitly invoked,  our analysis will179
focus entirely on application of Article 78 of the CISG in the FTCA practice.
Although Article 78 of the CISG provides that creditors are entitled to
interest on the sum in arrears, it does not instruct how to compute the
appropriate interest rate. This goal appeared to be too difficult to be achieved
during the drafting process. The issue remained controversial and complex,
often debated in the context of the CISG.  Judicial and arbitral practice180
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General Principles vs. National Law, 1 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. ARB. 3, 3–43 (1997); André Corterier,
A New Approach to Solving the Problem of the Interest Rate Under Article 78 CISG, 5 INT’L TRADE &
BUS. L. ANN. 33, 33–42 (2000); Volker Behr, The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting
to Problems in Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 263, 263–99 (1998); Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and
Interest Rates Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, in CORNELL REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 3–19 (1995); John Y. Gotanda, A Study of Interest
172–73 (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, No. 83, 2007), available at http://
law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art83; VILUS, supra note 6, at 172–73; M. Milutinoviæ, Kamatna
stopa zbog docnje u izvršenju novèane obaveze—da li je uniformno rešenje moguæe? [Interest Rates for
Late-Payment—Is a Uniform Solution Achievable?], 11 PRAVNI ŽIVOT 557–76 (2005); M. Stanivukoviæ,
Stopa zatezne kamate na ugovorna potraživanja u stranoj valuti kada je merodavno srpsko pravo [Default
Interest Rate Applicable to Foreign Currency Contractual Claims Governed by Serbian Law], ZBORNIK
RADOVA SA MEDJUNARODNE KONFERENCIJE “REGIONALNA SARADNJA U OBLASTI GRADJANSKOG SUDSKOG
POSTUPKA SA MEDJUNARODNIM ELEMENTOM” 207–25 (2009).
181. Those favoring uniform determination of interest rate pursuant to the general principles on which
the CISG is based have different starting positions. Some use the principle of full compensation, while
others resort to the principle of full restitution. Two of the solutions preferred within the uniform method
are application of the prevailing interest rate of the place of payment and application of international
interest rate, such as LIBOR. Those who prefer application of national law to the issue of interest rate have
different ideas on how to pick the proper law. Some propose application of the lex causae, others the law
of debtor’s seat, the law of the seller’s country, the law of the country of the currency, or the law of the place
of performance, etc.
182. The phrase “domicile interest rate” is often used in Serbian judgments and awards, although it
is not defined in any statute. The courts and tribunals have so far used this term to designate the interest
rate applicable in the country of origin of the currency in which the money is due, which sometimes results
in the application of statutory interest rates or the application of other otherwise applicable interest rates
such as the Federal Funds rate for debts in U.S. dollars. For example, according to the High Commercial
Court opinion of September 27, 2004, for claims in Euros, this rate is equal to the “euro interest rate set by
the Central European Bank.”
183. The parties chose Macedonian law to govern the issue of applicable interest rate. FTCA, Award
No. T-16/07, June 18, 2008.
worldwide is also anything but uniform, on either of the possible
approaches.  The practice of the FTCA is not different in that respect. We181
have identified five main approaches that were used to determine relevant
interest rate: (1) using national legislation on statutory interest rate; (2) using
the domicile interest rate  of a particular currency with reference to court and182
arbitral practice; (3) using the domicile interest rate of a particular currency
with reference to international payment usages; (4) examining the general
principles on which the CISG is based; and (5) applying the interest rate set
by the contract. Given the importance of the party autonomy rule under the
CISG, the last approach is, of course, always the preferable method of interest
calculation. Unfortunately, this approach has been used in only one contract
dispute before the FTCA.  The first two approaches operate on the183
assumption that the issue of interest rate is not governed by the CISG, i.e. that
it is lacuna intra legem. The third approach observes the international usages
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184. FTCA, Award No. T-09/01, Feb. 23, 2004 (awarding interest for late payment of price from the
date of filing of the claim instead of the date when payment was due, since these were the exact terms of
the claimant’s request).
185. OFFICIAL GAZETTE FRY, No. 32/93.
186. OFFICIAL GAZETTE FRY, No. 09/01.
187. FTCA, Award No. T-03/01, Sept. 24, 2001, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/010924sb.html; FTCA, Award No. T-09/02, Mar. 24, 2003; FTCA, Award No. T-18/04, May 24,
2005; FTCA, Award No. T-16/04, July 18, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-19/07, June 30, 2008.
188. See FTCA, Award No. T-13/05, Jan. 5, 2007 (applying Serbian legislation to statutory interest
rate with the following justification: “. . . having in mind that the legislator wanted to adequately protect
creditors who owed sums in [Serbian dinars] and has therefore provided for a monthly rate of compensation
in order to prevent decrease of the value of the sums owed due to the fall in the exchange rate.” This
resulted in applying 0.5% monthly interest rate to Euro-denominated debt. The arbitrator noted that this
approach was in accordance with Art. 3 of the Law on Statutory Interest Rate. One can suppose that this
kind of reasoning was due to the fact that domestic currency, the dinar, was enjoying a stable exchange rate,
as a primary source of law for the issue of interest rates, while the fourth
approach regards the matter of interest rate as lacuna praeter legem and
determines the interest rate via examination of CISG general principles.
Regardless of the approach taken by the arbitrators in the analyzed cases, the
tribunals have on all occasions observed the non ultra petita principle and
have never awarded interest at a rate higher, or for the period longer, than the
parties requested.184
1. Statutory Interest Rate Approach
Article 2 of the 1993 Yugoslav Law on Statutory Interest Rate  provided185
for a six percent interest rate on monetary claims in foreign currency. The
absence of an explicit rule on interest rate in the CISG led many of the FTCA
tribunals to direct application of the Yugoslav statutory rate whenever
conflict-of-laws rules chose Yugoslav (Serbian) law as applicable. With
similar justification, award number T-13/05 of January 5, 2007 applied the
interest rate provided by § 1333 of the ABGB since the parties had chosen
Austrian law to govern the contract.
The 2001 Amendments to the Law on Statutory Interest Rate  were186
designed to suppress effects of inflation and have derogated the provision on
statutory interest rate for foreign currency debts. Consequently in applying the
FTCA, the arbitrators took the position that computing interest rate for foreign
currency debts on the basis of rates for domestic currency, which are higher
than foreign rates, could ill serve the purpose of suppressing inflation and
would produce “unacceptable, inappropriate and onerous results for the
[debtors].”  Departures from this position were rare.187 188
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and that application of a different, lower, rate to foreign currency debts would prompt claimants to
denominate their claims in domestic currency, dinars, in order to avail themselves of a relatively high
interest rate prescribed for dinar-denominated debts.).
189. FTCA, Award No. T-03/01, Sept. 24, 2001, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
010924sb.html. In the present case, the 1994 Law on Statutory Interest Rate was in force at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, and it provided for a 6% rate for foreign currency. OFFICIAL GAZETTE FRY, No.
24/94. However, at the time when the arbitration proceedings took place, the 2001 Law on the Statutory
Interest Rate had already come into force, and it contained no such provision. The reasoning of the award
invoked the FTCA practice and the fact that the parties had the 1994 law in mind when concluding the
contract.
190. In FTCA, Award No. T-13/06, May 28, 2007, arbitrators noted that the CISG does not prescribe
interest rate on late payments and also remarked that Serbian law does not provide for interest rate on
foreign currency payments. They went on to apply domicile interest rate, stating that such approach is well-
established in domestic court and arbitral practice. Id. See also FTCA, Award No. T-14/03, Oct. 18, 2007;
FTCA, Award No. T-14/07, May 23, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-18/07, Oct. 15, 2008; FTCA, Award No.
T-1/08, Nov. 17, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-05/08, Jan. 5, 2009; FTCA, Award No. T-16/03, Jan. 27,
2009; FTCA, Award No. T-13/08, Mar. 16, 2009.
191. See FTCA, Award No. T-37/03, May 27, 2004; FTCA, Award No. T-03/05, Dec. 15, 2005;
FTCA, Award No. T-22/05, Oct. 30, 2006; FTCA, Award No. T-13/06, May 28, 2007; FTCA, Award No.
T-06/06, July 31, 2007; FTCA, Award No. T-17/06, Sept. 10, 2007; FTCA, Award No. T-08/06, Oct. 1,
2007; FTCA, Award No. T-14/03, Oct. 18, 2007; FTCA, Award No. T-24/06, Dec. 1, 2007; FTCA, Award
No. T-15/06, Jan. 28, 2008; FTCA, Award No. T-01/08, Nov. 17, 2008.
192. See FTCA, Award No. T-05/05, Apr. 4, 2007; FTCA, Award No. T-19/06, June 8, 2007; FTCA,
Award No. T-14/03, Oct. 18, 2007.
2. Interest Rate “In Accordance with Practice of Courts and Arbitration
Tribunals”
Despite the 2001 Amendments of the Law on Statutory Interest Rate,
arbitrators continued applying a six percent interest rate to foreign currency
debts as an emanation of established arbitration practice.  This was done to189
avoid an inadequate method of interest rate calculation which was designed
with dinar debts in mind. In other decisions, tribunals invoked the cursus
curiae est lex curiae rule and the established practice of the FTCA in order to
apply the domicile interest rate of a particular foreign currency.  Therefore,190
if the debt was euro-denominated, arbitrators awarded Central European Bank
deposit rates, marginal lending rates, or Euribor rates,  while debts191
denominated in US dollars were usually accompanied by application of the
Federal Funds Rate.192
2009] APPLICATION OF THE CISG BEFORE THE FOREIGN TRADE COURT 55
193. See Aleksandar Goldstajn, Usages of Trade and Other Autonomous Rules of International
Trade According to the UN Sales Convention, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, DUBROVNIK LECTURES
55, 95–110 (Paul Volken & Petar Šarèeviæ eds., 1986); HONNOLD, supra note 10, at 124; Michael Bridge,
A Commentary on Articles 1–13 and 78, in UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 32, at 235, 255; Martin
Schmidt-Kessel, Article 9, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 20, at 141–53; Jelena Peroviæ, Uloga
obièaja u medjunarodnoj prodaji robe [Role of Usages in International Sale of Goods], 5-8/02 PRAVO I
PRIVREDA 247, 247–54 (2002); STOJILJKOVIÆ, supra note 6, at 16–18, 145–47; ÆIRIÆ & DJUROVIÆ, supra
note 6, at 54–55.
194. On the other hand, the role of usages under the Serbian LCT is limited to situations where either
of the parties agree on their application or the law specifically calls for their application. The latter is the
case in approximately forty out of over a thousand articles of the law.
195. See The Rules of the FTCA, supra note 12, at art. 48(3) (2001); ICC Arbitration Rules art. 17(2)
(2008); China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission [CIETAC] Rules art. 53 (2005);
German Institution of Arbitration [DIS] Rules § 23.4 (1998); Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
[JAMS] Rules art. 18.3 (2005). However, there is no comparable provision in the Vienna rules, Zagreb
rules, or Rules of the LCIA.
196. See FTCA, Award No. T-16/04, July 18, 2005; FTCA, Award No. T-09/02, Mar. 24, 2003;
FTCA, Award No. T-08/05, Mar. 28, 2006; FTCA, Award No. T-03/06, Sept. 14, 2006; FTCA, Award No.
T-09/07, Jan. 23, 2008.
3. Interest Rate in Accordance with International Payment Usages
The role of usages within the framework of the CISG is rather specific.193
Article 9(2) permits that they may bind the parties, irrespective of whether
parties were aware of their existence, as long as they are “widely known to,
and regularly observed by, the parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned.”  The role of usages is further reinforced by rules194
of arbitral institutions, including the Rules of the FTCA, where arbitrators are
regularly instructed to take into account trade usages when deciding a case.195
Arbitration practice of the FTCA has predominantly, although not exclusively,
dealt with usages in the context of determining appropriate interest rates.
In some of the awards tribunals arrived at an appropriate interest rate by
invoking international usages contained in the 1992 UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Credit Transfers, which were deemed applicable on the basis
of Article 9(2) of the CISG.  For example, in award number T-17/06 of196
September 10, 2007 it was stated that:
These international commercial usages, codified in the Model Law, represent a common
practice which has been harmonized and widely applied in international trade, and is
repeatedly used and found applicable in cases where parties have not agreed otherwise.
Parties, who are both traders, knew or ought to have known of such usages. Payment of
interest in the case of default represents a regular and very widely observed practice in
the business environment.
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197. FTCA, Award No. T-9/07, Jan. 23, 2008.
Article 2(1)(m) of the Model Law on International Credit Transfers
defines interest as “the time value of the money involved, which, unless
otherwise agreed, is calculated at the rate and on the basis customarily
accepted by the banking community for the funds or money involved.”
Consequently, the average Eurozone interbanking rate was applied to euro-
denominated debt based on the excerpts from the May 2007 ECB Statistical
Bulletin. Similarly, in award number T-5/05 of April 4, 2007, it was stated
that, in the absence of CISG provisions specifying the interest rate, arbitrators
have to take into account widely accepted banking and commercial usages
where parties have implicitly subjected their contract to such usages and
where such usages are regularly observed in the same course of trade. The
tribunal held that the parties “knew or ought to have known, as professional
traders and business partners, of a widely accepted principle of commercial
practice that a defaulting debtor has to pay interest,” and went on to apply the
Federal Funds Rate on a dollar-denominated debt. Assuming that usage on the
applicable interest rate truly exists, such approach should be preferred in the
future, as it would bring predictable results and legal certainty to the
contracting parties.
Among the FTCA decisions dealing with usages, we have found award
number T-9/07 of January 23, 2008 to be particularly interesting, although the
application of usages in this case was not based on Article 9 of the CISG, but
rather on the applicable arbitration rules. Specifically, acting pursuant to
Article 48(3) of the FTCA Rules, which suggests application of trade usages,
the tribunal took into account the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL) and UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(PICC). Justifying its position, the tribunal stated that it:
[P]aid due regard to the widely known fact that from the end of the 20th and the
beginning of the 21st century there could be noted a development and harmonization of
a new international commercial practice and trade usages which was “codified” in the
form of the abovementioned UNIDROIT Principles, UML on International Credit
Transfers and Ole Lando Principles. They became available to everyone who performs
international business transactions as well as to those who arbitrate disputes in the field
of international commerce. Respectable arbitral tribunals in the world (especially the ICC
Court of Arbitration) have long since made awards pursuant to these Principles and
arbitrated disputes between parties by applying these principles as lex mercatoria.
Considering that there is no reason for this Court of Arbitration to keep avoiding their
application . . . .197
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198. Id.
199. Both PICC art. 7.4.9 and PECL art. 9.508 provide that the rate of interest should amount to the
average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the place
for payment. Application of PICC to the issue of interest rate has already been reported in a number of
cases. See Holzimplex Inc. v. Republican Agric. Unitary Enter., No. 8-5/2003 (Supreme Econ. Ct. of Belr.
May 20, 2003), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=635&step=Abstract;
ICC Arbitration Case No. 8769 (1996) (Switz.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=
2&id=656&do=case; ICC Arbitration Case No. 8128 (1995) (Switz.), available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?pid=2&id=637&do=case; Arbitral Award No. SCH-4318 (Internationales Schiedsgericht der
Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien 1994) (Austria), available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=635&step=FullText; Arbitral Award No. SCH-4366 (Internationales
Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft Wien 1994) (Austria), available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&id=636&do=case.
200. Both the timing of these documents and the drafting process make it difficult to sustain that
PICC and PECL are the principles on which the Convention is based. Namely, both PICC and PECL were
drafted more than a decade after adoption of the CISG. Furthermore, they were drafted under a more or less
private initiative whereas the CISG is the result of UNCITRAL’s efforts finalized at the Diplomatic
Conference in Vienna in 1980. Also, the preambles of these two documents provide for their scope of
application in a different setting in comparison to the CISG’s provisions on its scope of application, which
are directly applicable when conditions of Art. 1 are fulfilled. On the other hand, the scope of CISG’s
application is limited to certain issues arising out of contracts of sale, whereas PICC and PECL regulate
some of the issues regarding the sales contract not governed by the CISG, e.g. validity of a contract, and
other types of contracts. Finally, while PECL, as its name suggests, reflects the development of European
principles of contract law, the CISG is designed as a global instrument, which is confirmed both by the
diverse structure of the drafting committee and by the pertinent list of the CISG Contracting States. As to
the PICC, time will show whether recent UNCITRAL endorsement of the PICC at its 40th Plenary session
in the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL), Report of the UNICTRAL on the Work
of its Fortieth Session, 52–54, A/62/17 (Part I) (July 23, 2007), will influence the wider application of PICC
in the future. In any event, there is already a great number of authors who are advocating for the use of
PICC as means to fill the gaps in the CISG, at least when both documents are based on the general
principles of comparative law and international trade. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and CISG—Alternative or Complementary
The tribunal concluded that the said principles may offer a more modern set
of solutions for issues in the case at hand and that they “set general rules for
international commercial contracts” and “may be used for interpretation and
gap-filling of uniform international rules . . . and provisions of national
law.”198
Although the harmonizing goal is noble, it seems to us that invoking
PECL and PICC in the case at hand as lex mercatoria was not only erroneous
but also unnecessary, given that the disputed issue, assessment of damages,
was explicitly settled by the CISG. The only aspect where, theoretically, these
legal documents might have been of some assistance was the determination of
interest rate.  However, such approach would require importing invoked199
principles into the system of the CISG either through Article 7(2), general
principles on which the CISG is based,  or, more controversially, via Article200
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Instruments?, 26 UNIFORM L. REV. 26, 36–37 (1996); Magnus, supra note 97, at 492; Alejandro M. Garro,
The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in the International Sales Law: Some Comments on
the Interplay Between the Principles and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (1995); Pilar Perales
Viscasillas, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL in the Interpretation and Gap-Filling
of CISG, in CISG METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 288–89; Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral
Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129,
133–35 (1998); Jurgen Basedow, Uniform Law Conventions and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 129, 136–37 (2000); Ferrari, supra note 95; John
Y. Gotanda, Using the UNIDROIT Principles to Fill Gaps in the CISG (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper Series, No. 88, 2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art88/;
Harry Flechtner, The CISG’s Impact on International Unification Efforts: The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, in THE 1980 UNIFORM
SALES LAW: OLD ISSUES REVISTED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES 169, 190–97 (Franco Ferrari ed.,
2003); Bridge, supra note 83, at 249–52.
201. See Viscasillas, supra note 200, at 309–14; Michael Bridge, A Commentary on Articles 1–13
and 78, in UNICTRAL DIGEST, supra note 32, at 235, 255; Emmanuel Gaillard, La Distinction des
Principes Généraux du Droit et des Usages du Commerce International, in ETUDES OFFERTES À PIERRE
BELLER 203 (1991); U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Commercial
Arbitration: Law Governing the Merits of the Dispute, 25–26, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.40 (2005)
(prepared by Jean-Michel Jacquet), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add40_en.pdf;
FTCA, Award No. 229/1996, June 5, 1997; ICC Arbitration Case No. 9333, 10 Int’l Comm. Arb. No. 2 at
102 (1999).
202. FTCA, Award No. T-9/07, Jan. 23, 2008.
203. Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) is the rate at which euro interbank term deposits
within the euro zone are offered by one prime bank to another prime bank.
9(2).  The tribunal failed to apply either of these two approaches. Instead,201
the tribunal relied on the abovementioned sets of principles as usages, on the
basis of the Serbian Arbitration Law, FTCA Rules of Arbitration, and the
1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
Furthermore, the tribunal erred in application of these Principles by stating
that neither of these documents “determines the interest rate, but rather makes
it definable” and using them only as “a safe indicator how to determine such
a rate.”  The tribunal clearly failed to adhere to the basic “indicators”202
provided in these Principles by applying the average EURIBOR rate, a bank
to bank interest rate,  for the relevant time period as the appropriate rate for203
the “money [currency] involved,” instead of the “short term lending rate to
prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the place of
payment” (e.g. a bank to borrower interest rate) as required by the Principles.
4. Interest Rate Calculation Under the CISG General Principles
In only two out of a hundred FTCA cases the issue of interest rate was
resolved by application of the CISG general principles. In award number
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204. FTCA, Award No. T-23/06, Sept. 15, 2008.
205. FTCA, Award No. T-08/08, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/090128sb.html.
T-23/06 of September 15, 2008, the sole arbitrator expressly stated that the
interest rate for late payment should be determined on the basis of the CISG
general principles. Although the relevant principle itself was not clearly
identified, it seems from the wording of the award that the arbitrator had the
principle of full compensation in mind. Namely, upon examining the relevant
provisions of the CISG and Serbian contract law, the law applicable by means
of private international law, the arbitrator concluded that
[I]nterest for failure to pay money, i.e. statutory interest rate, is set as pre-determined
amount of damages whose occurrence does not need to be specifically proven. Both
CISG and LCT give the right to the creditor to seek further damages if this amount is not
sufficient. Hence, the amount of interest rate should correspond to the amount of pre-
determined actual damages which the creditor has suffered for debtor’s failure to perform
its obligation. When creditor does not receive performance of obligation when due it can
be presumed that the damages he suffers as a consequence of such failure can be
compensated by acquiring bank loan in the same amount as the amount due, at the
average interest rate for short-term loans for the currency of payment.204
While we agree with the arbitrator’s attempt in this case to resolve the
issue of interest rate by application of the CISG general principles and agree
with the definition of the purpose of interest, compensation for loss of use of
money, we disagree with calculation of interest in the described manner.
Firstly, had the purpose of interest been full compensation of the creditor,
there would have been no reference to the general damages provision in
Article 78 of the CISG. Hence, the interest is not there to necessarily fully
compensate the creditor, although awarding interest may lead to such an
outcome. Second, the application of the average bank lending rate could lead
to overcompensation of the creditor. Therefore, the application of somewhat
lower savings rate seems more appropriate to serve the needs that the right to
interest intends to cover. Had the creditor actually had to borrow the money
at the higher rate due to debtor’s breach of contract, both Articles 74 and 78
would allow him to recover such amounts as damages provided that all
preconditions for application of Article 74 are met, primarily that the creditor
can prove with reasonable certainty the extent of his loss.
The proposed approach has been accepted in one FTCA award.  In this205
case Serbian claimant requested a “domicile” Euro rate. The arbitrator first
noted that claimant is entitled to interest in accordance with Article 78 of the
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CISG and that “there is no need to examine [Seller]’s request in the light of
any national law, but rather examine whether it is within the checks provided
in Article 7 of the CISG,” since “the matter of interest rate is governed but not
settled under the CISG.”  Consequently, claimant’s request was examined206
in the light of any checks that might be imposed by Article 7 of the CISG and
the principles underlying the Convention, with special reference to
international case law supporting such an approach. Two relevant principles
were identified: (1) the principle of full compensation and (2) the principle
prohibiting overcompensation of the creditor. The request for “domicile”
interest rate was found to be in line with the above mentioned principles. The
arbitrator further stated that:
[I]n order to determine the exact “domicile” (Serbian) rate for euro, one should not resort
to Serbian law, since it regulates and is appropriate for local currency (RSD) rates only
and would result in overcompensation if applied to sums denominated in Euro. Rather,
it is more appropriate to apply interest rate which is regularly used for savings, such as
short-term deposits in the first class banks at the place of payment (Serbia) for the
currency of payment, as this represents rate on a relatively riskless investment. After
examining interest rate figures and indicators on short-term Euro deposits in Serbia, the
Sole arbitrator finds that the appropriate rate would be 6 percent annually.207
This approach is, to the best of our knowledge, novel in the international
case law but, in our view, provides for uniform solution to the issue of interest
rates under the CISG. What is more, this approach has already gained support
by some leading scholars.208
It is worth mentioning a third case where the sole arbitrator did not
resolve the issue of interest rate pursuant to CISG general principles, although
he did classify the interest rate issue as being governed but not settled by the
CISG.  Even though he listed the general principles of the CISG, bona fides,209
party autonomy, the foreseeability rule, the principle of cooperation, etc., the
arbitrator did not find them sufficient to resolve the issue. Consequently, he
consulted the rules of law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law. However, in doing so, the arbitrator found that “. . . in
accordance with the principle of full compensation the creditor is entitled to
expect that the interest rate will be set at the rate that he would expect under
2009] APPLICATION OF THE CISG BEFORE THE FOREIGN TRADE COURT 61
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. See Milutinoviæ Milena, Oslobodjenje od odgovornosti u medjunarodnoj prodaji robe
[Exemption from Liability in International Sales of Goods], 42 PRAVO I PRIVREDA 442 (2005) (Serb.); V.
STOJILJKOVIÆ, MEDJUNARODNO PRIVREDNO PRAVO [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, SPECIAL PART]
179–80 (2001) (Serb.); R. ÐUROVIÆ, A. ÆIRIÆ, MEÐUNARODNO TRGOVINSKO PRAVO—OPŠTI DEO
[INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, SPECIAL PART], Niš: Centar za publikacije Pravnog fakulteta, 50-2
(2005) (Serb.).
212. See FTCA, Award No. T-07/01, Feb. 21, 2002; FTCA, Award No. T-66/99, Oct. 15, 2001;
FTCA, Award No. T-01/00, Dec. 7, 2000.
the regulations of his country.”  It is somewhat surprising that the arbitrator210
did not opt for application of this principle within the framework of the CISG,
given that it is undisputedly one of the general principles on which the CISG
is based.
XII. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY TO PAY DAMAGES
Article 79 of the CISG provides debtor with right to claim exemption
from payment of damages if he can prove that his failure to perform is due “to
an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the
conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its
consequences.”211
Given the imposition of economic sanctions on trade with Yugoslavia
(Serbia) in the 1990s it was not surprising to find debtors invoking this article
in defense to claimant’s claim for damages for non-performance. However, in
three out of four cases where a vis major defense was invoked, the tribunals
erred in determining the appropriate substantive law and applied the
provisions of the LCT instead of the CISG.  There is only one award where212
this question has been analyzed from the CISG perspective. However, even
this case does not contribute significantly to the understanding of the
operation of this article under the CISG. Namely, in award number T-8/06 of
October 1, 2007, seller’s assertions justifying its non-performance of the
loading of the first consignment and its transportation by occurrence of “the
situation that represents vis maior” and “the oscillation in the level of the
water mark” did not suffice to release the seller from the liability for non-
performance. This conclusion was supported by the fact that the situation
described by the seller in his letter as an obstacle to the performance of the
contractual obligation did not prima facie meet the conditions regarding the
notice set out in Article 79 of the CISG and the sales contract itself.
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XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The survey of application of the CISG before the FTCA confirms both the
importance of interpretation of the CISG in the light of its international
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application. A great
number of the cases we examined dealt with the issues which are neither
particularly controversial, nor unique. However, on a few occasions the FTCA
practice revealed factual patterns and controversies for which we could not
find comparable foreign decisions and awards.
The first hurdle in applying the CISG in the FTCA practice is determining
whether it is applicable. The percentage of correct decisions on this point
steadily grew over the years. It is still notable, although hardly surprising, that
erring tribunals almost always err in favor of the domestic law. Decisions
where tribunals mistakenly applied the CISG where it should not have been
applied are extremely rare.
A unique problem with respect to the application of the CISG in the
region was caused by the need to examine the controversial effects of the
dissolution of the SFRY to the succession of former Yugoslav republics to
multilateral treaties, such as the CISG. In this respect, a particular tension was
noted between the need to protect parties’ legitimate expectations, on the one
hand, and a country’s belated filing of notification of succession to the CISG
with retroactive application on the other. The Macedonian example has been
given special attention as its notification of succession to the CISG was filed
more than a decade after the dissolution of the SFRY.
Once the decision on the application of the CISG was made, there were
several more obstacles to the correct application of its substantive provisions.
Imprecise translations of the CISG dating back to ratification by former
Yugoslavia created some glitches for those who did not consult any of the
original versions. Another type of problem, which appears to be universal, was
reflected in tribunals’ tendency to treat the CISG ‘in the spirit’ of national law
provisions.
Despite these occasional departures from the proper application and
interpretation of the CISG, in most of the cases the CISG was correctly
applied. Even situations where this has not been the case have usually been of
minor importance and did not affect the final outcome. Finally, the increasing
trend of invoking foreign case law in the FTCA awards gives reason to expect
that the quality in the decision making process before the FTCA will further
increase and that consulting FTCA case law will represent a fruitful source for
any scholar and practitioner interested in the CISG jurisprudence.
